Thales 9000 with AS2805 Interchange & RSA EFTPOS Commands.

Interchange Cryptographic Keys 

Interchange keys are used to protect financial transactions initiated at Acquirer eftpos / ATM Terminals while in transit to the Issuer institution. Interchange keys may be either:

(a) PIN encrypting keys – used to protect the customer PIN from the point of origin to the point of authorisation. PIN encrypting keys are a specific instance of session keys;

(b) Session keys – used to secure, validate and protect the financial message. Session keys can be further qualified into those used in the terminal to Acquirer environment (terminal session keys) or on node to node links (interchange session keys);

(c) Key Encrypting Keys (KEK) – used to protect other keys (e.g. session keys) during exchange; or

(d) Transport Keys – used to protect keys (e.g. KEKs) during transport to the partner institution.

Cryptographic Algorithms 

DEA3 and DEA2 are the only approved algorithms for the protection of interchange information (full details of these algorithms may be found in the Australian standard AS 2805 part 5).

DEA3 keys are 128 bits in length (effectively 112 bits) and are generally referred to as triple DES or 3DES keys (the corresponding encryption algorithm is specified in AS 2805 part 5.4). Triple DES may also be acceptably implemented using a key length of 192 bits (effectively 168 bits).

DEA3 with a key length of 128 bits and DEA2 with key lengths equal to, or greater than 2048 bits are the minimum acceptable requirements for the effective protection of interchange information at the time of the issuance of this document.

In accordance with AS 2805 part 3, DEA3 must be used for PIN encipherment.

 Interchange Links 

For all Interchange Links, Issuers and Acquirers must ensure that:

(a) Security for Transactions processed over that Interchange Link complies with AS2805 Part 6;

(b) Message formats comply with AS2805 Part 2;

(c) Security of transactions from terminal to Acquirer and from Acquirer to Issuer complies with AS2805 Part 6;

(d) PIN security and encryption complies with AS2805 Parts 3 and 5.4;

(e) Key management practices comply with AS2805 Part 6.1;

In each case and as more particularly set out in Part 8:

(a) Message Authentication must apply to all Interchange Links;

(b) The Message Authentication Code (MAC) must be calculated using, as a minimum, a DEA 3 (128-bit) key, Triple DES and an algorithm conforming to AS2805 Part 4; and

(c) all interchange PIN and MAC cryptographic functions must be performed within a Tamper-responsive SCM

The Actual process using an Thales 9000 HSM (CECS Approved)

Now what we are clear on the actual requirements of CECS and APCA, lets  attempt to do this using  a Thales 9000.

Generate a Sponsor RSA key pair

This command is the first step as would be required to do this for all terminal commands.

  • This is done my using the HSM EI host Command, from the HSM base manual.
    • The input is the length of the RSA key set required,  and the length go the public key modulus.
  • The Public Key Verification Code should now be generated. This is done using the HSM H2 Command from the Australian Standards Support Manual.

The Public Key and the PVC are sent to your Interchange Partner via different paths, as per their direction. (lets call this OUR-Key and OUR-PVC)

Your Interchange partner will now do the same process and provide you with a Public Key and a PVC. (lets call this THEIR-Key and THEIR-PVC)

When we receive this Public Key from our Interchange Partner, the following should happen:

  • The PVC for the Key should be generated using the HSM H2 Command from the Australian Standards Support Manual.
  • The MAC for the Key should be generated using the HSM EO command from the HSM Base Manual.

We now have public keys exchanged and have them ready for use!!

Our Database should be looking like this:

|OUR-Key|OUR-PVC|THEIR-Key|THEIR-PVC|THEIR-MAC|GEN-PVC|

Now we have the Public keys exchanged and ready for use, we can generate our KEKs & send to Interchange Partner, and receive our KEKr from Interchange Partner;

  • To send our KEKs we will use the H4 command from the Australian Standards support manual.
  • To receive our KEKr we will use the H6 command from the Australian Standards support manual.

Once these are decrypted and stored in our key database we can generate and exchange our session MAC and PIN keys.

    • To generate and store our send keys we use the OI command from the Australian Standards support manual.
    • To receive and store our receive keys we use the OK command from the Australian Standards support manual.

Now we have all the keys in place we can start to process transactions.

    • To generate the MAC on a message there are a number of commands available, however as we are using the AS2805 standards we always recommend our customers use the C2 command from the Australian Standards support manual. This provides all the options required for the Australian environment.

Similarly to verify the MAC on a message there are a number of commands available, however as we are using the AS2805 standards we always recommend our customers use the C4 command from the Australian Standards support manual. This provides all the options required for the Australian environment.

Terminal Commands

Terminal Manufacturer will be injecting into the PINpads their Manufacturer Public Key. The MPK will be transmitted to SPONSOR securely. The MPK validity should be checked by verifying the PVC, this is achieved by generating a Public Key Verification Code This is done using the H2 command from the Australian Standards support manual. And the two values compared.

  • We also need to generate a PPASN, this is achieved using the AS2805 PK command.
  • The host will now send the SPK to the PINpad, the PINpad will now generate the KI (also known as KTI), and send to the host. This is recovered using the AS2805 host H8 command, which also returns the KCA, the KCA is encrypted under the LMK and the KTI.
  • Now we have the MPK and have verified it is genuine, we now need to generate a MAC for the Public Key, this is achieved using the Host EO command, this is used in subsequent processing. Note: this command is only available when the HSM is in Authorised State. We can now recover the PINpad Public from the MSK. This is achieved using the AS2805 H0 host command.
  • KCA is now used to create the TMK1 and TMK2 (also known as KEK1 & KEK2). These are generated using the C0 command.
  • Now we have the TMK’s in place we can use the TMK update commands.

Updating the Keys

  • When updating only TMK1 the AS2805 OU command is used.
  • When updating both TMK1 and TMK2 then the OW command is used.

Now we have the TMK’s in place and able to be updated, we can generate the Session Keys to be used for the PIN, MAC & optional encryption keys if required.

This is achieved using the AS2805 PI command. The PI command will generate the PIN, MAC, and optional Encryption keys.

  • Now we can have the session keys in place we can Decrypt the data, verify the MAC & verify the pin. The decrypt data & verify MAC steps depend on how it has been handled by the terminal. Has the terminal done the MAC first then encrypted the required data or has the terminal encrypted the data & then done the MAC. We have assumed that the Encrypt was done first.
  • Verify the MAC’s on the transactions from the terminal using the AS2805 C4.
  • Once the MAC has been verified we can then decrypt the required data with the AS2805 host command PW.
  • Now we have the required decrypted data you will need to either verify the PIN or Translate the PIN, to translate the PIN assuming the transaction is a debit card transaction. This is achieved using the AS2805 PO host command. To verify the PIN will use one of the following F0 or F2.

If you have translated the PIN we can form the message and generate a MAC for the message to be sent to Interchange Partner, this is achieved using the C2 command as detailed above in the Interchange messages.

The biggest problem we see with this are around the KEKs & KEKr is people get them around the wrong way. Your KEKs becomes the remote KEKr & vice versa. The AS2805 commands are designed to swap them over automatically. 

The other gotcha is we split the terminal side & the interchange side of the HSM, TMK (terminal master key) is like a KEK (ZMK (Zone master key)) but used on the terminal side of the network where a ZMK (KEKs & KEKr) is used for interchange side of the network.

 easy as Pie!

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Parsing AS2505/8583 Messages

Foreword

Previously I briefly touched on the AS2805 standards, and now I have an implementation of the parsing of these messages

The full code of this post is available here : https://github.com/Arthurvdmerwe/AS2805_Python_Implementation

I have a C# implementation of this as well here:

https://github.com/Arthurvdmerwe/AS2805

The code is thanks to the following author: http://www.vulcanno.com.br/python/ISO8583.html

He has a brilliant implementation of all the structures of the 8583 format, which goes hand in hand with AS2805

First off, the AS2805 standard includes a range of specifications, from Key handling settlement. This is not a post to explain all the details, as the key and settlement handling is a processor specific implementation.

AS2805 is extremely similar to the ISO8583 specification, and most of it can be taken directly out of this specification.

AS2805 Financial transaction card originated messages — Interchange message specifications is the International Organization for Standardization standard for systems that exchange electronic transactions made by cardholders using payment cards. It has three parts:

  • Part 1: Messages, data elements and code values
  • Part 2: Application and registration procedures for Institution Identification Codes (IIC)
  • Part 3: Maintenance procedures for messages, data elements and code values

Introduction

A card-based transaction typically travels from a transaction acquiring device, such as a point-of-sale terminal or an automated teller machine (ATM), through a series of networks, to a card issuing system for authorization against the card holder’s account. The transaction data contains information derived from the card (e.g., the account number), the terminal (e.g., the merchant number), the transaction (e.g., the amount), together with other data which may be generated dynamically or added by intervening systems. The card issuing system will either authorize or decline the transaction and generate a response message which must be delivered back to the terminal within a predefined time period.

AS2805 defines a message format and a communication flow so that different systems can exchange these transaction requests and responses. The vast majority of transactions made at ATMs use AS2805 at some point in the communication chain, as do transactions made when a customer uses a card to make a payment in a store (EFTPOS). In particular, both the MasterCard andVisa networks base their authorization communications on the ISO 8583 standard, as do many other institutions and networks. AS2805 has no routing information, so is sometimes used with aTPDU header.

Cardholder-originated transactions include purchase, withdrawal, deposit, refund, reversal, balance inquiry, payments and inter-account transfers. AS2805 also defines system-to-system messages for secure key exchanges, reconciliation of totals, and other administrative purposes.

Although AS2805 defines a common standard, it is not typically used directly by systems or networks. It defines many standard fields (data elements) which remain the same in all systems or networks, and leaves a few additional fields for passing network specific details. These fields are used by each network to adapt the standard for its own use with custom fields and custom usages.

The placements of fields in different versions of the standard varies;

An AS2805 message is made of the following parts:

  • Message type indicator (MTI)
  • One or more bitmaps, indicating which data elements are present
  • Data elements, the fields of the message

 

Message type indicator

This is a 4 digit numeric field which classifies the high level function of the message. A message type indicator includes the ISO 8583 version, the Message Class, the Message Function and the Message Origin, each described briefly in the following sections. The following example (MTI 0110) lists what each digit indicates:

  0xxx -> version of AS2805 
  x1xx -> class of the Message (Authorization Message)
  xx1x -> function of the Message (Request Response)
  xxx0 -> who began the communication (Acquirer)

AS2805 version

Position one of the MTI specifies the versions of the AS2805 standard which is being used to transmit the message.

Position Meaning
0xxx ISO 8583-1:1987 version
1xxx ISO 8583-2:1993 version
2xxx ISO 8583-1:2003 version
3xxx Reserved for ISO use
4xxx Reserved for ISO use
5xxx Reserved for ISO use
6xxx Reserved for ISO use
7xxx Reserved for ISO use
8xxx Reserved for National use
9xxx Reserved for Private use

Message class

Position two of the MTI specifies the overall purpose of the message.

Position Meaning Usage
x1xx Authorization Message Determine if funds are available, get an approval but do not post to account for reconciliation, Dual Message System (DMS), awaits file exchange for posting to account
x2xx Financial Messages Determine if funds are available, get an approval and post directly to the account, Single Message System (SMS), no file exchange after this
x3xx File Actions Message Used for hot-card, TMS and other exchanges
x4xx Reversal Message Reverses the action of a previous authorization
x5xx Reconciliation Message Transmits settlement information message
x6xx Administrative Message Transmits administrative advice. Often used for failure messages (e.g. message reject or failure to apply)
x7xx Fee Collection Messages
x8xx Network Management Message Used for secure key exchange, logon, echo test and other network functions
x9xx Reserved by ISO

Message function

Position three of the MTI specifies the message function which defines how the message should flow within the system. Requests are end-to-end messages (e.g., from acquirer to issuer and back with timeouts and automatic reversals in place), while advices are point-to-point messages (e.g., from terminal to acquirer, from acquirer to network, from network to issuer, with transmission guaranteed over each link, but not necessarily immediately).

Position Meaning
xx0x Request
xx1x Request Response
xx2x Advice
xx3x Advice Response
xx4x Notification
xx8x Response acknowledgment
xx9x Negative acknowledgment

Message origin

Position four of the MTI defines the location of the message source within the payment chain.

Position Meaning
xxx0 Acquirer
xxx1 Acquirer Repeat
xxx2 Issuer
xxx3 Issuer Repeat
xxx4 Other
xxx5 Other Repeat

Examples

Bearing each of the above four positions in mind, an MTI will completely specify what a message should do, and how it is to be transmitted around the network. Unfortunately, not all AS2805 implementations interpret the meaning of an MTI in the same way. However, a few MTIs are relatively standard:

MTI Meaning Usage
0100 Authorization request Request from a point-of-sale terminal for authorization for a cardholder purchase
0110 Issuer Response Issuer response to a point-of-sale terminal for authorization for a cardholder purchase
0120 Authorization Advice When the Point of Sale device breaks down and you have to sign a voucher
0121 Authorisation Advice Repeat If the advice times out
0130 Issuer Response to Authorization Advice Confirmation of receipt of authorization advice
0200 Acquirer Financial Request Request for funds, typically from an ATM or pinned point-of-sale device
0210 Issuer Response to Financial Request Issuer response to request for funds
0220 Acquirer Financial Advice e.g. Checkout at a hotel. Used to complete transaction initiated with authorization request
0221 Acquirer Financial Advice repeat If the advice times out
0230 Issuer Response to Financial Advice Confirmation of receipt of financial advice
0400 Acquirer Reversal Request Reverses a transaction
0420 Acquirer Reversal Advice Advises that a reversal has taken place
0421 Acquirer Reversal Advice Repeat Message If the reversal times out
0430 Issuer Reversal Response Confirmation of receipt of reversal advice
0800 Network Management Request Echo test, logon, log off etc.
0810 Network Management Response Echo test, logon, log off etc.
0820 Network Management Advice Keychange

Bitmaps

Within AS2805, a bitmap is a field or subfield within a message which indicates which other data elements or data element subfields may be present elsewhere in a message.

A message will contain at least one bitmap, called the Primary Bitmap which indicates which of Data Elements 1 to 64 are present. A secondary bitmap may also be present, generally as data element one and indicates which of data elements 65 to 128 are present. Similarly, a tertiary, or third, bitmap can be used to indicate the presence or absence of fields 129 to 192, although these data elements are rarely used.

The bitmap may be transmitted as 8 bytes of binary data, or as 16 hexadecimal characters 0-9, A-F in the ASCII or EBCDIC character sets.

A field is present only when the specific bit in the bitmap is true. For example, byte ’82x is binary ‘1000 0010’ which means fields 1 and 7 are present in the message and fields 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are not present.


Examples —–

Bitmap Defines presence of
4210001102C04804 Fields 2, 7, 12, 28, 32, 39, 41, 42, 50, 53, 62
7234054128C28805 Fields 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 22, 24, 26, 32, 35, 37, 41, 42, 47, 49, 53, 62, 64
8000000000000001 Fields 1, 64
0000000000000003
(secondary bitmap)
Fields 127, 128

Explanation of Bitmap (8 BYTE Primary Bitmap = 64 Bit) field 4210001102C04804
BYTE1 : 01000010 = 42x (counting from the left, the second and seventh bits are 1, indicating that fields 2 and 7 are present)
BYTE2 : 00010000 = 10x (field 12 is present)
BYTE3 : 00000000 = 00x (no fields present)
BYTE4 : 00010001 = 11x (fields 28 and 32 are present)
BYTE5 : 00000010 = 02x (field 39 is present)
BYTE6 : 11000000 = C0x (fields 41 and 42 are present)
BYTE7 : 01001000 = 48x (fields 50 and 53 are present)
BYTE8 : 00000100 = 04x (field 62 is present)

0________10________20________30________40________50________60__64
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234  n-th bit
0100001000010000000000000001000100000010110000000100100000000100  bit map

Fields present in the above variable length message record:
2-7-12-28-32-39-41-42-50-53-62

Data elements

Data elements are the individual fields carrying the transaction information. There are up to 128 data elements specified in the original AS2805 standard, and up to 192 data elements in later releases.

While each data element has a specified meaning and format, the standard also includes some general purpose data elements and system- or country-specific data elements which vary enormously in use and form from implementation to implementation.

Each data element is described in a standard format which defines the permitted content of the field (numeric, binary, etc.) and the field length (variable or fixed), according to the following table:

Abbreviation Meaning
a Alpha, including blanks
n Numeric values only
s Special characters only
an Alphanumeric
as Alpha & special characters only
ns Numeric and special characters only
ans Alphabetic, numeric and special characters.
b Binary data
z Tracks 2 and 3 code set as defined in ISO/IEC 7813 and ISO/IEC 4909 respectively
. or .. or … variable field length indicator, each . indicating a digit.
x or xx or xxx fixed length of field or maximum length in the case of variable length fields.

Additionally, each field may be either fixed or variable length. If variable, the length of the field will be preceded by a length indicator.

Type Meaning
Fixed no field length used
LLVAR or (..xx) Where LL < 100, means two leading digits LL specify the field length of field VAR
LLLVAR or (…xxx) Where LLL < 1000, means three leading digits LLL specify the field length of field VAR
LL and LLL are hex or ASCII. A VAR field can be compressed or ASCII depending of the data element type. LL can be 1 or 2 bytes. For example, if compressed as one hex byte, ’27x means there are 27 VAR bytes to follow. If ASCII, the two bytes ’32x, ’37x mean there are 27 bytes to follow. 3 digit field length LLL uses 2 bytes with a leading ‘0’ nibble if compressed, or 3 bytes if ASCII. The format of a VAR data element depends on the data element type. If numeric it will be compressed, e.g. 87456 will be represented by 3 hex bytes ‘087456x. If ASCII then one byte for each digit or character is used, e.g. ’38x, ’37x, ’34x, ’35x, ’36x.
AS2805-defined data elements
Data element Type Usage
1 b 64 Bit map (b 128 if secondary is present and b 192 if tertiary is present)
2 n ..19 Primary account number (PAN)
3 n 6 Processing code
4 n 12 Amount, transaction
5 n 12 Amount, settlement
6 n 12 Amount, cardholder billing
7 n 10 Transmission date & time
8 n 8 Amount, cardholder billing fee
9 n 8 Conversion rate, settlement
10 n 8 Conversion rate, cardholder billing
11 n 6 Systems trace audit number
12 n 6 Time, local transaction (hhmmss)
13 n 4 Date, local transaction (MMDD)
14 n 4 Date, expiration
15 n 4 Date, settlement
16 n 4 Date, conversion
17 n 4 Date, capture
18 n 4 Merchant type
19 n 3 Acquiring institution country code
20 n 3 PAN extended, country code
21 n 3 Forwarding institution. country code
22 n 3 Point of service entry mode
23 n 3 Application PAN number
24 n 3 Function code (ISO 8583:1993)/Network International identifier (NII)
25 n 2 Point of service condition code
26 n 2 Point of service capture code
27 n 1 Authorizing identification response length
28 n 8 Amount, transaction fee
29 n 8 Amount, settlement fee
30 n 8 Amount, transaction processing fee
31 n 8 Amount, settlement processing fee
32 n ..11 Acquiring institution identification code
33 n ..11 Forwarding institution identification code
34 n ..28 Primary account number, extended
35 z ..37 Track 2 data
36 n …104 Track 3 data
37 an 12 Retrieval reference number
38 an 6 Authorization identification response
39 an 2 Response code
40 an 3 Service restriction code
41 ans 16 Card acceptor terminal identification
42 ans 15 Card acceptor identification code
43 ans 40 Card acceptor name/location (1-23 address 24-36 city 37-38 state 39-40 country)
44 an ..25 Additional response data
45 an ..76 Track 1 data
46 an …999 Additional data – ISO
47 an …999 Additional data – national
48 an …999 Additional data – private
49 an 3 Currency code, transaction
50 an 3 Currency code, settlement
51 an 3 Currency code, cardholder billing
52 b 64 Personal identification number data
53 n 18 Security related control information
54 an …120 Additional amounts
55 ans …999 Reserved ISO
56 ans …999 Reserved ISO
57 ans …999 Reserved national
58 ans …999 Reserved national
59 ans …999 Reserved for national use
60 an .7 Advice/reason code (private reserved)
61 ans …999 Reserved private
62 ans …999 Reserved private
63 ans …999 Reserved private
64 b 16 Message authentication code (MAC)
65 b 64 *Bit indicator of tertiary bitmap only*, tertiary bitmap data follows secondary in message stream.
66 n 1 Settlement code
67 n 2 Extended payment code
68 n 3 Receiving institution country code
69 n 3 Settlement institution country code
70 n 3 Network management information code
71 n 4 Message number
72 ans …999 Data record (ISO 8583:1993)/n 4 Message number, last(?)
73 n 6 Date, action
74 n 10 Credits, number
75 n 10 Credits, reversal number
76 n 10 Debits, number
77 n 10 Debits, reversal number
78 n 10 Transfer number
79 n 10 Transfer, reversal number
80 n 10 Inquiries number
81 n 10 Authorizations, number
82 n 12 Credits, processing fee amount
83 n 12 Credits, transaction fee amount
84 n 12 Debits, processing fee amount
85 n 12 Debits, transaction fee amount
86 n 15 Credits, amount
87 n 15 Credits, reversal amount
88 n 15 Debits, amount
89 n 15 Debits, reversal amount
90 n 42 Original data elements
91 an 1 File update code
92 n 2 File security code
93 n 5 Response indicator
94 an 7 Service indicator
95 an 42 Replacement amounts
96 an 8 Message security code
97 n 16 Amount, net settlement
98 ans 25 Payee
99 n ..11 Settlement institution identification code
100 n ..11 Receiving institution identification code
101 ans 17 File name
102 ans ..28 Account identification 1
103 ans ..28 Account identification 2
104 ans …100 Transaction description
105 ans …999 Reserved for ISO use
106 ans …999 Reserved for ISO use
107 ans …999 Reserved for ISO use
108 ans …999 Reserved for ISO use
109 ans …999 Reserved for ISO use
110 ans …999 Reserved for ISO use
111 ans …999 Reserved for ISO use
112 ans …999 Reserved for national use
113 n ..11 Authorizing agent institution id code
114 ans …999 Reserved for national use
115 ans …999 Reserved for national use
116 ans …999 Reserved for national use
117 ans …999 Reserved for national use
118 ans …999 Reserved for national use
119 ans …999 Reserved for national use
120 ans …999 Reserved for private use
121 ans …999 Reserved for private use
122 ans …999 Reserved for private use
123 ans …999 Reserved for private use
124 ans …255 Info text
125 ans ..50 Network management information
126 ans …999 Issuer trace id
127 ans …999 Reserved for private use
128 b 16 Message authentication code

Implementation and understanding the Code

The first step to understanding the packing and unpacking of the message fields would be to create a class that describes then entire structure.

First we create a class and create a dictionary that describes the message formats:

 #2805 contants
 _DEF = {}
 # Every _DEF has:
 # _DEF[N] = [X, Y, Z, W, K]
 # N = bitnumber
 # X = smallStr representation of the bit meanning
 # Y = large str representation
 # Z = length indicator of the bit (F, LL, LLL, LLLL, LLLLL, LLLLLL)
 # W = size of the information that N need to has
 # K = type os values a, an, ans, n, xn, b
 _DEF[1] = ['BM', 'Bit Map Extended', 'F', 8, 'b']
 _DEF[2] = ['2', 'Primary Account Number (PAN)', 'LL', 19, 'n']
 _DEF[3] = ['3', 'Processing Code', 'F', 6, 'n']
 _DEF[4] = ['4', 'Amount Transaction', 'F', 12, 'n']
 _DEF[5] = ['5', 'Amount Settlement', 'F', 12, 'n']
 _DEF[7] = ['7', 'Transmission Date and Time', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[9] = ['9', 'Conversion Rate, Settlement', 'F', 8, 'n']
 _DEF[10] = ['10', 'Conversion Rate, Cardholder Billing', 'F', 8, 'n']
 _DEF[11] = ['11', 'Systems Trace Audit Number', 'F', 6, 'n']
 _DEF[12] = ['12', 'Time, Local Transaction', 'F', 6, 'n']
 _DEF[13] = ['13', 'Date, Local Transaction', 'F', 4, 'n']
 _DEF[14] = ['14', 'Date, Expiration', 'F', 4, 'n']
 _DEF[15] = ['15', 'Date, Settlement', 'F', 4, 'n']
 _DEF[16] = ['16', 'Date, Conversion', 'F', 4, 'n']
 _DEF[18] = ['18', 'Merchant Type', 'F', 4, 'n']
 _DEF[22] = ['22', 'POS Entry Mode', 'F', 3, 'n']
 _DEF[23] = ['23', 'Card Sequence Number', 'F', 3, 'n']
 _DEF[25] = ['25', 'POS Condition Code', 'F', 2, 'n']
 _DEF[28] = ['28', 'Amount, Transaction Fee', 'F', 9, 'xn']
 _DEF[32] = ['32', 'Acquiring Institution ID Code', 'LL', 11, 'n']
 _DEF[33] = ['33', 'Forwarding Institution ID Code', 'LL', 11, 'n']
 _DEF[35] = ['35', 'Track 2 Data', 'LL', 37, 'an']
 _DEF[37] = ['37', 'Retrieval Reference Number', 'F', 12, 'an']
 _DEF[38] = ['38', 'Authorization ID Response', 'F', 6, 'an']
 _DEF[39] = ['39', 'Response Code', 'F', 2, 'an']
 _DEF[41] = ['41', 'Card Acceptor Terminal ID', 'F', 8, 'ans']
 _DEF[42] = ['42', 'Card Acceptor ID Code', 'F', 15, 'ans']
 _DEF[43] = ['43', 'Card Acceptor Name Location', 'F', 40, 'asn']
 _DEF[44] = ['44', 'Additional Response Data', 'LL', 25, 'ans']
 _DEF[47] = ['47', 'Additional Data National', 'LLL', 999, 'ans']
 _DEF[48] = ['48', 'Additional Data Private', 'LLL', 999, 'ans']
 _DEF[49] = ['49', 'Currency Code, Transaction', 'F', 3, 'n']
 _DEF[50] = ['50', 'Currency Code, Settlement', 'F', 3, 'n']
 _DEF[51] = ['51', 'Currency Code, Billing', 'F', 3, 'n']
 _DEF[52] = ['52', 'PIN Data', 'F', 8, 'b']
 _DEF[53] = ['53', 'Security Related Control Information', 'F', 48, 'b']
 _DEF[55] = ['55', 'ICC Data', 'LLL', 999, 'b']
 _DEF[57] = ['57', 'Amount Cash', 'F', 12, 'n']
 _DEF[58] = ['58', 'Ledger Balance', 'F', 12, 'n']
 _DEF[59] = ['59', 'Account Balance', 'F', 12, 'n']
 _DEF[64] = ['64', 'Message Authentication Code', 'F', 8, 'b']
 _DEF[66] = ['66', 'Settlement Code', 'F', 1, 'n']
 _DEF[70] = ['70', 'Network Management Information Code', 'F', 3, 'n']
 _DEF[74] = ['74', 'Credits, Number', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[75] = ['75', 'Credits, Reversal Number', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[76] = ['76', 'Debits, Number', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[77] = ['77', 'Debits, Reversal Number', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[78] = ['78', 'Transfer, Number', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[79] = ['79', 'Transfer, Reversal Number', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[80] = ['80', 'Inquiries, Number', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[81] = ['81', 'Authorizations, Number', 'F', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[83] = ['83', 'Credits, Transaction Fee Amount', 'F', 12, 'n']
 _DEF[85] = ['85', 'Debits, Transaction Fee Amount', 'F', 12, 'n']
 _DEF[86] = ['86', 'Credits, Amount', 'F', 16, 'n']
 _DEF[87] = ['87', 'Credits, Reversal Amount', 'F', 16, 'n']
 _DEF[88] = ['88', 'Debits, Amount', 'F', 16, 'n']
 _DEF[89] = ['89', 'Debits, Reversal Amount', 'F', 16, 'n']
 _DEF[90] = ['90', 'Original Data Elements', 'F', 42, 'n']
 _DEF[97] = ['97', 'Amount, Net Settlement', 'F', 17, 'xn']
 _DEF[99] = ['99', 'Settlement Institution ID Code', 'LL', 11, 'n']
 _DEF[100] = ['100', 'Receiving Institution ID Code', 'LL', 11, 'n']
 _DEF[112] = ['112', 'Key Management Data', 'LLL', 999, 'b']
 _DEF[118] = ['118', 'Cash Total Number', 'LLL', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[119] = ['119', 'Cash Total Amount', 'LLL', 10, 'n']
 _DEF[128] = ['128', 'MAC Extended', 'F', 8, 'b']

To write this structure should not be that difficult and should come directly out of the specification provided my your institution.

As for the infamous bitmaps we are going to describe a structure for them as well, with an array to track the bit positions.

 #Attributes
 # Bits to be set 00000000 -> _BIT_POSITION_1 ... _BIT_POSITION_8
 _BIT_POSITION_1 = 128 # 10 00 00 00
 _BIT_POSITION_2 = 64 # 01 00 00 00
 _BIT_POSITION_3 = 32 # 00 10 00 00
 _BIT_POSITION_4 = 16 # 00 01 00 00
 _BIT_POSITION_5 = 8 # 00 00 10 00
 _BIT_POSITION_6 = 4 # 00 00 01 00
 _BIT_POSITION_7 = 2 # 00 00 00 10
 _BIT_POSITION_8 = 1 # 00 00 00 01

 #Array to translate bit to position
 _TMP = [0, _BIT_POSITION_8, _BIT_POSITION_1, _BIT_POSITION_2, _BIT_POSITION_3, _BIT_POSITION_4, _BIT_POSITION_5,
 _BIT_POSITION_6, _BIT_POSITION_7]
 _EMPTY_VALUE = 0

Now we simply add a heap of helper functions from  http://www.vulcanno.com.br/python/ISO8583.html to fill and decode the data structure.

I have created a client and a server as part of the source code, so you can test your own implementation of the AS2805 protocol

Simple as pie!

 

 

AS2805 Standards for EFT

Australia Standards 2805 (AS2805) is the standard for Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) and Payments in Australia and New Zealand. AS2805 is also used for some implementations in South Africa and SE Asian.

AS2805 is owned by Australia Standards and was developed by various voluntary working groups within Committee IT/5. The implementation of AS2805 standards across all industries is clearly defined by the Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA) as part of the Consumer Electronic Clearing System (CECS) and detailed in the CECS Manual.

Contrary to popular belief AS2805 is not a rename of the ISO8583 standard in the Australia Standards numbering system, as is the case with most international standards.

ISO8583 was first published in 1987, while AS2805 was published two years earlier in 1985, after a lengthy period of draft and review in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. ISO8583 consists of three (3) parts:

  • Part 1: Messages, Data Elements and Code Values
  • Part 2: Application and Registration Procedures for Institution Identification Codes (IIC)
  • Part 3: Maintenance Procedures for Messages, Data Elements and Code Values

All three (3) parts of ISO8583 are concentrated on only message formats between devices (EFTPOS and ATM) and an acquiring host. ISO8583 can be seen as a small subset of the AS2805 standard and there is no clear guide for uniform implementation as is the case with CECS. AS2805 on the other hand consist of at least thirty three (33) separate published parts and covers general EFT topics such as:

  • Card Management & Authorisation
  • Card Detail Updating
  • PIN Management
  • Key Management and Security
  • Message Authentication
  • Privacy and Data Encryption
  • Communications
  • Message Structure between Devices and Acquiring Host
  • Message Structure between Hosts
  • File Transfers

The thirty three (33) AS2805 standards published so far are the following:

2805.1 Part 1: Communications
2805.2 Part 2: Message Structure, format and content
2805.3.1 Part 3.1: PIN Management and Security – General
2805.3.2 Part 3.2: PIN Management and Security – Offline
2805.4.1 Part 4.1: Message Authentication – Mechanisms Using a Block Cipher
2805.4.2 Part 4.2: Message Authentication – Mechanisms Using a Hash Function
2805.5.1 Part 5.1: Ciphers – Data Encipherment Algorithm 1 (DEA 1)
2805.5.2 Part 5.2: Ciphers – Modes of Operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm
2805.5.3 Part 5.3: Ciphers – Data Encipherment Algorithm 2 (DEA 2)
2805.5.4 Part 5.4: Ciphers – Data Encipherment Algorithm 3 (DEA 3) & related techniques
2805.6.1.1 Part 6.1.1: Key Management – Principles
2805.6.1.2 Part 6.1.2: Key Management – Symmetric Ciphers, their Key Management & Life Cycle
2805.6.1.4 Part 6.1.4: Key Management – Asymmetric Cryptosystems – Key Management & Life Cycle
2805.6.2 Part 6.2: Key Management – Transaction keys
2805.6.3 Part 6.3: Key Management – Session Keys – Node to Node
2805.6.4 Part 6.4: Key Management – Session Keys – Terminal to Acquirer
2805.6.5.1 Part 6.5.1: Key Management – TCU Initialisation – Principles
2805.6.5.2 Part 6.5.2: Key Management – TCU Initialisation – Symmetric
2805.6.5.3 Part 6.5.3: Key Management – TCU Initialisation – Asymmetric
2805.6.6 Part 6.6: Key Management – Session Keys – Node to Node with KEK Replacement
2805.9 Part 9: Privacy of Communications
2805.10.1 Part 10.1: File Transfer Integrity Validation
2805.10.2 Part 10.2: Secure File Transfer (Retail)
2805.11 Part 11: Card Parameter Table
2805.12.1 Part 12.1: Message Content – Structure and Format
2805.12.2 Part 12.2: Message Content – Codes
2805.12.3 Part 12.3: Message Content – Maintenance of Codes
2805.13.1 Part 13.1: Secure Hash Functions – General
2805.13.2 Part 13.2: Secure Hash Functions – MD5
2805.13.3 Part 13.3: Secure Hash Functions – SHA-1
2805.14.1 Part 14.1: Secure Cryptographic Devices (Retail) – Concepts, Requirements and Evaluation Methods
2805.14.2 Part 14.2: Secure Cryptographic Devices (Retail) – Security Compliance Checklist for Devices used in Financial Transactions
2805.16 Part 16: Merchant Category Codes

The AS2805 standard also provides three (3) published Handbooks related to the AS2805 standard:

HB 127 EFT – Implementing Message Content Standards – Conversion Handbook
HB 128 EFT – Implementing Message Content Standards – Terminal Handbook
HB 129 EFT – Implementing Message Content Standards – Interchange Handbook

There are a number of guideline white papers available to assist the implementation of EFT related functionality such as:

  • Card Management & Production
  • EFTPOS/POS Software Management
  • EFTPOS and POS Product Management
  • Software and Configuration File Downloading
  • Retail Electronic Data Exchange (EDT) that covers price downloads, ordering and statistics
  • Retail Automation
  • Terminal Management
  • Merchant Management
  • Cashier Management
  • Fraud Monitoring and Management