# Importing ZPK and ZMK into Thales Payshield 9000 HSM

ZMK

Zone Master Key (ZMK) also known as an Interchange key (IK), is a key-encrypting key which is distributed manually between two communicating sites, within a shared network, in order that further keys can be exchanged automatically. The ZMK is used to encrypt keys of a lower level (e.g. ZPK) for transmission.

The ZMK is exchanged using secured methods and Split knowledge policy. The IK is split into two components that are sent by two separate physical couriers to two nominated Security Officers of the other party. This is one of the most secure way to do it since no single person gains knowledge of the clear ZMK.

Here is the detailed Process. please note values indicated here are for testing only, in live environment the values will be exchanged securely.

Build ZMK Key manually:

This key is generated by two components, lets call them K1 and K2. To obtain the ZMK Key,

ZMK = K1 XOR K2


Test values provided,

K1 (clear) = 6D6B E51F 04F7 6167 4915 54FE 25F7 ABEF
K2 (clear) = 6749 9B2C F137 DFCB 9EA2 8FF7 57CD 10A7

ZMK (clear) key = K1 XOR K2 = 0A227E33F5C0BEACD7B7DB09723ABB48;
KCV = 05EE1D


Import ZMK into HSM

FK
Key length [1,2,3]: 2
Key Type: 000
Key Scheme: U
Component type [X,H,E,S]: X
Enter number of components (2-9): 2
Enter component #1: 6D6BE51F04F76167491554FE25F7ABEF
Enter component #2: 67499B2CF137DFCB9EA28FF757CD10A7

Encrypted key: U E685 8676 0A16 3026 C297 1007 3AB2 D7BE
Key check value: 05EE1D


ZPK

Zone PIN Key (ZPK) also known as a A PIN Protection Key (PPK), is a data encrypting key which is distributed automatically and is used to encrypt PINs. For security and protocol reasons the HSM where this key generated, never exposes the ZPK in clear. But it can be exported using another key called ZMK (Interchange Key). In this context exports actually means use the ZMK Key to encrypt the ZPK and give back to the user.

Import ZPK

The following ZPK shared by communicating party, is encrypted under ZMK

ZPK encrypted under ZMK: AC4D3C5F603C1B502E5F45668A155C25
KCV: AFDA4F


From the host application, send the A6 commands with required arguments as following,

HSM Command:

0000A6001UE68586760A163026C29710073AB2D7BEXAC4D3C5F603C1B502E5F45668A155C25U00


Where,

Atalla Variant = 00
Encrypted PPK Key = AC4D…….5C25
Key Scheme= X
Key Scheme LMK= U
Key Type = 001
ZMK = E68586760……..D7BE
ZMK Scheme = U

Response:
0000A700U5F2DC42E10C92B16BA54802314CE95F5AFDA4F

ZPK under LMK: U5F2DC42E10C92B16BA54802314CE95F5
KCV: AFDA4F


Here we can compare KCV (AFDA4F) to check if key is imported successfully.

Standard

# DUKPT Explained with examples

Derived Unique Key Per Transaction (DUKPT) process that’s described in Annex A of ANS X9.24-2004.

It’s generally considered to be complex, but I’ve simplified it slightly with the help of online resources.

## Key Management

Here’s a basic outline of the technique:

1. You’re given a Base Derivation Key (BDK), which you assign to a swiper (note that the same BDK can be assigned to multiple swipers).
2. You’ll use the BDK along with the device’s own unique Key Serial Number (KSN) to generate an Initial PIN Encryption Key (IPEK) for the device.
3. You’ll assign this IPEK to a swiper, which uses it to irreversibly generate a list of future keys, which it’ll use to encrypt its messages.
4. The swiper’s KSN is used along with one of its future keys to encrypt a message, and after each swipe it’ll increment the value of its KSN.
5. Whenever a swiper takes a card it formats the card’s information into a series of tracks, each track having a particular set of information (e.g. card number, holder’s name, expiration date).
6. The swiper usually encrypts these tracks using one of its generated future keys (called the “Session Key”) along with its current KSN. It’ll then increment the value of its KSN and discard the future key it used.
7. At this point you’ll probably have an encrypted track along with the KSN the swiper used to encrypt it.
8. It’s your responsibility to determine what BDK was used to initialize this device, and from there you’ll use the BDK and KSN to rederive the IPEK, which is used to rederive the Session Key, which is finally used to decrypt the message.

There’s a lot of technical information to be said about key management, but this isn’t the place for that. In some cases your provider/manufacturer (e.g. MagTek) will supply you with swipers that need to be initialized with an IPEK, and your supplier will usually have a manual that walks you through that process. If you’re doing encryption/decryption through a third party who also supplies swipers, they may have already loaded the devices with that information; what’s more is they may not even given you the BDK that belongs to your device in order to reduce the risk of security threats.

Note: Key management is beyond the scope of this explanation. Whatever you do with your keys, just make sure it’s secure.

One methodology I’ve seen that’ll allow you to associate a particular KSN to a BDK is to take the current KSN you’ve been given, mask it to retrieve the Initial Key Serial Number (IKSN), and look up the BDK in a table that maps IKSNs to BDKs:

Example:

ksn = FFFF9876543210E00008
iksn = ksn & FFFFFFFFFFFFFFE00000 // FFFF9876543210E00000


You’d then have a table that looks like:

IKSN BDK
0xFFFF9876543210E00000 0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210

From which you could easily grab the BDK 0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210.

## Algorithm

Note: Assume that all numeric values are hexadecimal numbers, or the representation of a sequence of bytes as a hexadecimal number.

The following are the BDK, KSN, and encrypted track message (cryptogram) we’ve been given:

bdk = 0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210
ksn = FFFF9876543210E00008


Here’s an example of the unencrypted track 1 data (cryptogram above), and below that is its value in hex; this is what we’ll get after successfully decrypting the cryptogram:

%B5452300551227189^HOGAN/PAUL      ^08043210000000725000000?
2542353435323330303535313232373138395E484F47414E2F5041554C2020202020205E30383034333231303030303030303732353030303030303F00000000


Note: As you’re probably already aware, this algorithm is best described using big numbers, which can’t be represented as literals in some programming languages (like Java or C#). However, many languages have classes that allow you to represent big numbers in other ways (e.g., java.math.BigInteger, System.Numerics.BigInteger). It’s your job to adapt this algorithm so that it can be represented in your language of choice. Two small problems I encountered were ensuring the correct endianness and signedness were being used (this algorithm requires the byte order to be big endian and that unsigned integers are used). I made a utility class called BigInt to do this for me.

First, let’s define a few standard functions:

• DES and Triple DES refer to their respective cryptographic algorithms. Most programming languages have access to some implementation of these ciphers either through OpenSSL or Bouncy Castle. These ciphers are initialized with a zeroed out IV of 8 bytes, they’re zero-padded, and use Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC). Let’s define the signatures for these standard functions that’ll be used throughout this algorithm:
• DesEncrypt(key, message) -> returns cryptogram
• DesDecrypt(key, cryptogram) -> returns message
• TripleDesEncrypt(key, message) -> returns cryptogram
• TripleDesDecrypt(key, cryptogram) -> returns message

First we must create the IPEK given then KSN and BDK:

CreateIpek(ksn, bdk) {
return TripleDesEncrypt(bdk, (ksn & KsnMask) >> 16) << 64
}


Now we can get the IPEK:

ipek = CreateIpek(ksn, bdk)
= CreateIpek(FFFF9876543210E00008, 0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210)
= 6AC292FAA1315B4D858AB3A3D7D5933A


After that we need a way to get the Session Key (this one is more complicated):

CreateSessionKey(ipek, ksn) {
return DeriveKey(ipek, ksn) ^ FF00000000000000FF
}


The DeriveKey method finds the IKSN and generates session keys until it gets to the one that corresponds to the current KSN. We define this method as:

DeriveKey(ipek, ksn) {
ksnReg = ksn & FFFFFFFFFFE00000
curKey = ipek
for (shiftReg = 0x100000; shiftReg > 0; shiftReg >>= 1)
if ((shiftReg & ksn & 1FFFFF) > 0)
curKey = GenerateKey(curKey, ksnReg |= shiftReg)
return curKey
}


Where the GenerateKey method looks like:

GenerateKey(key, ksn) {
return EncryptRegister(key ^ KeyMask, ksn) << 64
| EncryptRegister(key, ksn)
}


And EncryptRegister looks like:

EncryptRegister(key, reg) {
return (key & FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) ^ DesEncrypt((key & FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0000000000000000) >> 64,
key & FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF ^ reg)
}


Then you can generate the Session Key given the IPEK and KSN:

key = CreateSessionKey(ipek, ksn)
= CreateSessionKey(6AC292FAA1315B4D858AB3A3D7D5933A, FFFF9876543210E00008)
= 27F66D5244FF621EAA6F6120EDEB427F


Which can be used to decrypt the cryptogram:

message = TripleDesDecrypt(key, cryptogram)
= 2542353435323330303535313232373138395E484F47414E2F5041554C2020202020205E30383034333231303030303030303732353030303030303F00000000
= %B5452300551227189^HOGAN/PAUL      ^08043210000000725000000?


That’s it, you’re done!

Standard
Financial Switching

# EFTPOS Initialisation using RSA Cryptography

Before you start with RSA, you should generate a public and private key pair using your HSM. These can be group keys or specific to the terminal you need to connect. Your terminal manufacturer will also provide its public key and modulus. Using these keys you will be able to calculate the TMK1 and TMK2 and also your session keys. The process is in fact very simple.

Here is an example of how to create these keys using a Thales HSM

Generating an 1536 bit RSA Key

Input

001-EI2153601

Output

001-EJ00
Public Key
3081C80281C0A0FAFB1789B87F6F075B04FE60B5F20AC9D658E6C9B9B4E82AD41FD748A5A00CAF0A5691D2D01726AB073AFB7B91810430F240244E0D4737A397C747FC67C622B12E3654DCDF4F58EE29241616AE7EBA08A1E16DB79E09529FB6CA92213F2DFAB3F677793BF977D640107FBF9833842A0BFBF5F871709E78EE5A152E0BBBBBDDED80D193BAC3033FE412B3C420532A8B309942E76F7A9FB4475B8EDEFDDADC4C101FF02F74BEE0261C681E314124654C39411E2CE56FE719A45CA7592B8431D30203010001
Private key length
0488
Private Key
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

Generate a MAC on 1536 RSA key

Input

002-EO01<3081C80281C0A0FAFB1789B87F6F075B04FE60B5F20AC9D658E6C9B9B4E82AD41FD748A5A00CAF0A5691D2D01726AB073AFB7B91810430F240244E0D4737A397C747FC67C622B12E3654DCDF4F58EE29241616AE7EBA08A1E16DB79E09529FB6CA92213F2DFAB3F677793BF977D640107FBF9833842A0BFBF5F871709E78EE5A152E0BBBBBDDED80D193BAC3033FE412B3C420532A8B309942E76F7A9FB4475B8EDEFDDADC4C101FF02F74BEE0261C681E314124654C39411E2CE56FE719A45CA7592B8431D30203010001>

Output

002-EP00<C905141E><3081C80281C0A0FAFB1789B87F6F075B04FE60B5F20AC9D658E6C9B9B4E82AD41FD748A5A00CAF0A5691D2D01726AB073AFB7B91810430F240244E0D4737A397C747FC67C622B12E3654DCDF4F58EE29241616AE7EBA08A1E16DB79E09529FB6CA92213F2DFAB3F677793BF977D640107FBF9833842A0BFBF5F871709E78EE5A152E0BBBBBDDED80D193BAC3033FE412B3C420532A8B309942E76F7A9FB4475B8EDEFDDADC4C101FF02F74BEE0261C681E314124654C39411E2CE56FE719A45CA7592B8431D30203010101>

This is a generic version of RSA encryption using POS pinheads, there are variations in the field. Please keep that in mind when reading this.

Now when a POS terminal logs on for the first time it shall always logon using a 9820 message with a network management information code of 191, containing the TCU public key signed by the manufacturer’s secret key, and the un-enciphered PPID.

The Financial Switch shall respond with a 9830 message with the same network management information code, communicating the public key of the sponsor host (PKsp), and a random number.

The PIN Pad shall then generate the KI and send a 9820 message with a network management information code of 192 to the Financial Switch, containing the KI, PPID, date & time stamp, the random number and user data enciphered under the Financial Switch’s public key (PKsp) and signed by the TCU’s secret key (SKtcu). You will need to extract this information using your HSM H8 command, example below:

Input Data:

001-H801<FDC694A6>
<30550250AB378F98E373BBC6FA5E698F4F095A6D693A851E53C35CC9633947399C09D70932776DBEA5F2F0F0C4DAB4693CACB4D07B19242FF0435C55E3D4E28EFD563457F7EBA31BE1123DEA78CEC1573716130B020103>
;990192
<99658789F42672E7C51CB6ECAF3F061BBABCD954D4113E1CD9BD7BD4DF1BD94E6CBC10F497E9AE68265E87F77BFF293AA2D9FDE9C1A8F12A04D9B4D8DB9F5EAEE4690883838DEF670174E70C79E674F97E2457DD85EEEB346A17DD1F39CB3E8B2D69949436051994F8687F0FEE6558F28180D5A63946CD60604B1C82F6AE14454F5824CBFDCEE07478D2F0239299B64CD900DFF7559423E98F0C7AB8229933E4DD5A5E0BD736F8172668676949493577E323FC8EC592437F6DF20EDB5FBB6E92>
;0080
;1234567890123456;000

Response:

001-H900
H604A678C8C78E1B9CFD415220D418E76
U9912C5D8B113B5E9D6787D57EE9E43BA
1122334455
9876543210987654

The Financial Switch shall check the PPID and random number. If the check fails, it will respond with a 9830 with a response code of “63”.

Where the Financial Switch is satisfied with the contents of the second 9820 message, it shall respond with the KCA and the KMACH enciphered under KI and its AIIC in the clear. When the PIN Pad has deciphered KCA and KMACH, it shall erase KI.

At this time the PIN Pad shall calculate the KIA. When the KIA has been calculated, the PIN Pad shall erase KCA.

The POS terminal shall then generate a 9820 message with a network management information code of 193 to the Financial Switch containing the PPID and the Financial Switch shall respond with a 9830 response containing the two initial KEKs and the PPASN.

You can generate this using the C0/C1 HSM command.

The POS terminal shall validate the MAC on the two KEKs and the PPASN and, if the MAC is valid, shall install KEK1, KEK2 and the PPASN and shall calculate the single length DES key KMACI. These keys are the terminal initial keys, that will updated in the season key exchange.

Once this has been carried out, the PIN Pad shall erase the KIA.

When these tasks have been completed, the POS terminal shall carry out its normal logon and session key installation with the Financial Switch. As the processing (initial logon then normal logon and session key installation) completes, the POS terminal will move into the “Ready” state.

easy as pie!

Standard

# ATM Pin encryption using 3DES

## Introduction

Most modern ATM’s use a Triple Des algorithm to encrypt the pin and send it to a host server for processing. Once the host system receives the pin, it does a translation of the pin from one encryption key to another, and sends it to a bank. In this post I will attempt to explain the process and how it is done in the real world.

## Overview of the Triple Data Encryption Standard

What we all call Triple DES is EDE (encrypt, decrypt, encrypt). The way that it works is that you take three 56-bit keys, and encrypt with K1, decrypt with K2 and encrypt with K3. There are two-key and three-key versions. Think of the two-key version as merely one where K1=K3. Note that if K1=K2=K3, then Triple DES is really Single DES.

Triple DES was created back when DES was getting a bit weaker than people were comfortable with. As a result, they wanted an easy way to get more strength. In a system dependent on DES, making a composite function out of multiple DESes is likely to be easier than bolting in a new cipher and sidesteps the political issue of arguing that the new cipher is better than DES.

As it turns out, when you compose a cipher into a new one, you can’t use a double enciphering. There is a class of attacks called meet-in-the-middle attacks, in which you encrypt from one end, decrypt from the other, and start looking for collisions (things that give you the same answer). With sufficient memory, Double DES (or any other cipher) would only be twice as strong as the base cipher — or one bit more in strength.

There’s more to it. If the cipher forms a group, then encrypting twice with two keys is equivalent to encrypting once with some key. Now, it’s not trivial to know what that other key is, but it means that a brute-force attack would find that third key as it tried all possible single-keys. So if the cipher’s a group, then multiple-ciphering is merely a waste of time.

Applying this encryption in Python is trivial as there are plenty of tested libraries that can provide the functionality like pyDes and Crypto :

import os
from Crypto.Cipher import DES3

def encrypt_file(in_filename, out_filename, chunk_size, key, iv):
des3 = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CFB, iv)

with open(in_filename, 'r') as in_file:
with open(out_filename, 'w') as out_file:
while True:
if len(chunk) == 0:
break
elif len(chunk) % 16 != 0:
chunk += ' ' * (16 - len(chunk) % 16)
out_file.write(des3.encrypt(chunk))

def decrypt_file(in_filename, out_filename, chunk_size, key, iv):
des3 = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CFB, iv)

with open(in_filename, 'r') as in_file:
with open(out_filename, 'w') as out_file:
while True:
if len(chunk) == 0:
break
out_file.write(des3.decrypt(chunk))

## ATM Internals and how they calculate the keys

When you have an ATM, you typically need to provide it with a set of encryption keys from your host, or HSM. These keys are clear text keys and it’s not encrypted in any way. Your host will link them to your terminal number, and when the ATM encrypts the pin; the host will know what keys are used so it can decrypt / translate them to the bank. The clear keys are never stored by the host, only the LMK encrypted keys.

Lets assume your host provides the following keys to you as the ‘ATM Encryption Key’ :

Clear component A: 67C4 A719 1ADA FD08 6432 CE0D D638 4AB
Key check value: 20D40B
Clear component B: 8A89 6D4C 4625 5E2A 1A75 2002 07A7 D35E
Key check value: 4EC801
Combined Check Value: 2B547D

Now typically you would enter the clear components into the ATM, as Encryption keys, and the ATM will combine them (Basically XOR Them) and derive the check value. If the check value match, then all is good.

What happens at your host end is the following:

Your host will also combine the keys and encrypt them under the LMK (Local Master Key). It will then use this key to encrypt all other keys that are sent to the ATM.

Now the ATM have a Terminal Master Key that it can use to decrypt all keys that are sent to it from the host.

## ATM Configuration Request (Key Exchange)

Now when an ATM starts up, the first thing it does it send a configuration request to the host. This request is to get the Third key used in Triple DES.  The Host will generate a random Terminal Pin Key and encrypt it under the Terminal Master Key (TMK). Since the ATM has the Terminal Master Key, it can decrypt the encrypted TPK, and use all 3 Keys now for the Triple DES operations. (it actually uses 2)

The Host would generally execute the A0 Thales command to get this key. He would store the key in the key database to do the decryption / translation later.

## Pin Encryption / Decryption

When a ATM gets ready to transmit a transaction it does the 3DES operation on the Pin only. the cypher text is now transmitted to the host. The host never knows the pin code, and only does a translation of the pin from the terminal keys to the bank keys.

The Host will have the following:

(ZPK) Zone Pin Key – from the Bank during Host to Bank Key exchange

(TPK) Terminal Pin Key – from Terminal using Terminal Configuration Request

(PAN) Account Number –  from Transaction transmitted.

With these values, the Host can translate the pin using a HSM, below is an example of the D4 Command.

 Res = KeyGenerator.TranslatePIN_TDES(TerminalPINKey=self.Crypto["TPK_LMK"], PINEncryptionKey=self.HostKeys["ZPK_LMK"], PINBlock=self.iso.getBit(52), AccountNumber=track2["PAN"][-13:-1])

def get_commandTPKPinBlock(self, TerminalPINKey, PINEncryptionKey, PINBlock, AccountNumber):

command_code = 'D4'
KTP = TerminalPINKey
KPE = PINEncryptionKey
PinBlock = PINBlock
PAN = AccountNumber

message = command_code
message += KTP
message += KPE
message += PinBlock
message += PAN
return message
#transmit to HSM

The transaction can now be transmitted to the acquiring bank with the translated pin for processing.

Sometimes the ATM requires a Message Authentication Code, this will be covered in another post.

easy as pie

Standard

# Implementing AS2805 Part 6 Host to Host Encryption using a Thales 9000 and Python

### Introduction

The AS2805.6 Standard specifies communication security between two nodes during a financial transaction. These nodes needs to have a specific set of encryption algorithms, and needs to follow a specific process.

The specification is not very clear on what exactly needs to happen, so I intend to clarify the exact steps, with the HSM functions. Now in order to do this I will assume you have a Thales 9000 HSM, as well as you need to know how to properly operate it. All commands defined are in the 1270A547-015 Australian Standards LIC003 v2.3a.pdf Manual provided by Thales when purchasing the device.

### Source Code

a Copy of this Manual can be found  here  [Thales 9000 Australian Standards LIC003 v2.3a]

a Copy of my AS2805  parser is located here

a Copy of my Thales commands class is located here

a Full version of a AS2805 Interchange Node is located here

### KEK Process (Level 1)

For this process:

1. you need to go to your HSM and generate 2 Clear components, you then need to form a KEKs key from these components. This can be done using the UI of the HSM manger, or with the FK console command.
2. Store the KEKs formed from the clear components in your switch database.
3. Your connecting node / host will then provide you with a set of clear components, you need to generate a key again, but in this case a KEKr
4. You need to provide you host with your key components you generated in Step 1,so they can generate their corresponding KEKs.

Now you have a KEKr and a KEKs in your database as well as your host read,  for Level2

### Session and MAC key Initialisation (Level 2)

This Level has 2 separate steps, the first step (Logon) validating the KEKr and KEKs so that both nodes know that the correct keys are being used. The second step (Key Exchange) is to create temporary keys that are changed every 60 minutes or 256 transactions.

##### Logon Process

During the logon process your HSM will need to generate 2 things:

1. a Random Number (RN)
2. an Inverted Random Number (~RN)

These numbers will be returned encrypted under the KEKr and KEKs, and you will need to validate them, this is also called end of proof point validation.

The Logon process is a 2 step process outlined in the image below.

###### Step 1

When you connect to your host you will receive a logon request, bit number 48 will be populated with a KRs from the host that you will need to validate with your KEKr.

Generating a KEKr Validation Response you would need your KRs received in this request, and you KEKr that you generated from your host components.

E2 Command Definition: To receive a random key (KRs) encrypted under a variant of a double length Key Encrypting Key (KEKr), compute from KRs another value, denoted KRr and encrypt it under another variant of the KEKr

Your HSM command will look as follows: >HEADE2{KEKr}{KRs} and you output will generate a KEKr. Your response to the host will need to include this value in bit number 48.

###### Step 2

You now need to send the host a logon request with bit 48 set with your KRs

E0 Command Definition:To generate a random key (KRs) and encrypt it with a variant of a double length Key Encrypting Key (KEKs). In addition, KRs is inverted (to form KRr) and the result encrypted with another variant of the KEKs.

Your HSM command will look as follows: >HEADE0{KEKs} and the output will generate a KRs.  Your host will validate this request, and return with a response.

Once both steps are complete, both you and the host has been validated that you are using the same keys.

An Example of this process is outlined below in Python:

 def __signon__Part1__(self):
self.log.info("====Sign-On Process Started ====")
self.__setState('signing_on')
cur = self.con_switch.cursor(MySQLdb.cursors.DictCursor)

try:
self.log.info("Waiting for 0800 Request")
self.s.settimeout(20.0)
length_indicator = self.s.recv(2)
if length_indicator == '':
self.log.critical('Received a blank length indicator from switch... might be a disconnect')
self.__setState("blank_response")
else:
size = struct.unpack('!H', length_indicator)[0]
d = datetime.now()
self.log.info(" Getting Sign-On Request 0800 = [%s]" % payload)
self.log.critical('Received a blank response from switch... might be a disconnect')
self.__setState("blank_response")
else:
iso_ans = AS2805(debug=False)

if iso_ans.getMTI() == '0800':
if iso_ans.getBit(70) == '001':
#log.info("Logon Started with KEKr = %s, KEKs = %s" % ( self.KEKr, self.KEKs))
KRs = iso_ans.getBit(48)
#log.info("KRs %s Received from Host" % (KRs))
#print "Generating a E0 Command with KEKr=%s, and KRs=%s" % (self.KEKr, KRs)
self.ValidationResponse = KeyGenerator.Generate_KEKr_Validation_Response(KEKr=self.KEKr, KRs=KRs)
#print self.ValidationResponse

if self.ValidationResponse["ErrorCode"] == '00':
#log.info("KRs Validation Response %s generated" % (self.ValidationResponse["KRr"]))
d = datetime.now()
iso_resp = AS2805(debug=False)
iso_resp.setMTI('0810')
iso_resp.setBit(7, d.strftime("%m%d%H%M%S"))
iso_resp.setBit(11, iso_ans.getBit(11))
iso_resp.setBit(33, self.Switch_IIN)
iso_resp.setBit(39, '303')
iso_resp.setBit(48, self.ValidationResponse["KRr"])
iso_resp.setBit(70, '0001')
iso_resp.setBit(100, self.Switch_IIN)

iso_send = iso_resp.getNetworkISO()
iso_send_hex = ByteUtils.HexToByte(iso_send[2:])
self.log.info("Sending Sign-On Response 0810 [%s]" % ReadableAscii(iso_send))
self.__send_message(iso_send_hex)
self.__storeISOMessage(iso_resp, {"date_time_sent": d.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")})
self.__setState('signed_on')
else:
self.log.error("0810 KRr Response Code = %s, Login Failed" % (self.ValidationResponse["ErrorCode"],))
#TODO: Send Decline to the Partner

else:

except InvalidAS2805, ii:
self.log.error(ii)
except socket.error as e:
pass
self.log.debug("nothing from host [%s]" % (e))
except:
#self.__signoff()
self.log.exception("signon_failed")
self.__setState("singon_failed")
finally:
cur.close()

def __signon_Part2__(self):

try:
self.s.settimeout(20.0)
self.ValidationRequest = KeyGenerator.Generate_KEKs_Validation_Request(KEKs=self.KEKs)
d = datetime.now()
iso_resp = AS2805(debug=False)
iso_resp.setMTI('0800')
iso_resp.setBit(7, d.strftime("%m%d%H%M%S"))
iso_resp.setBit(11, self.__getNextStanNo())
iso_resp.setBit(33, self.HostIIN)
iso_resp.setBit(48, self.ValidationRequest["KRs"])
iso_resp.setBit(70, '001')
iso_resp.setBit(100, self.HostIIN)
iso_send = iso_resp.getNetworkISO()
iso_send_hex = ByteUtils.HexToByte(iso_send[2:])

self.log.info("Sending Sign-On Request 0800 [%s]" % ReadableAscii(iso_send))
self.__send_message(iso_send_hex)
self.__storeISOMessage(iso_resp, {"date_time_sent": d.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")})

self.log.info("Waiting for 0810 Response")
a = self.s.recv(8192)
d = datetime.now()
self.log.info(" Getting Sign-On Response 0810 = [%s]" % payload)
iso_ans = AS2805(debug=False)
self.log.debug(iso_ans.dumpFields())
if iso_ans.getBit(39) == '3030':
self.log.info("====Sign-On Sequence Completed Successfully====")
self.__setState("signed_on_dual")
else:
#self.__signoff()
self.__setState("singon_failed")
except InvalidAS2805, ii:
self.log.info(ii)
except socket.error as e:
self.log.info("nothing from host [%s]" % (e))
except:
#self.__signoff()
self.log.exception("signon_failed")
self.__setState("singon_failed")

### Key Exchange (Level 2)

In the Key Exchange process, you will generate session keys for your node as well as MAC keys. Now when generating these keys, you need to remember that they need to be the same type as you partner node. (simply ask your processor for a trace if you want to confirm)

So right after a successful logon, you would need to wait for a key exchange request, (0820 with field 30 as 303) this key exchange request will have  a ZAK and a ZPK in field 48, these are encrypted under the KEKr generated on your host from their components. You would need to translate these keys using your KEKr under your LMK and generate check values for verification.

The command will look like follows: >HEADOK{KEKr}21H{ZPK}1H{ZAK}0H11111111111111111111111111111111

These keys are known as your: RECEIVE KEYS

Where the KEKr is the KEKr generated from your components, ZPK and ZAK is the ZPK and ZAK received. This will output the following:

def Translate_a_Set_of_Zone_Keys(KEKr, ZPK, ZAK, ZEK):
response = KeyClass.execute_Translate_a_Set_of_Zone_Keys(KEKr, ZPK, ZAK, ZEK)
#print response
TranslatedZoneKeys = {}
TranslatedZoneKeys["ResponseCode"] = response[6:8]
TranslatedZoneKeys["ErrorCode"] = response[8:10]
if TranslatedZoneKeys["ErrorCode"] == '00':
TranslatedZoneKeys["KCV Processing Flag"] = response[10:11]
TranslatedZoneKeys["ZPK(LMK)"] = response[11:44]
TranslatedZoneKeys["ZPK Check Value"] = response[44:50]
TranslatedZoneKeys["ZAK(LMK)"] = response[50:83]
TranslatedZoneKeys["ZAK Check Value"] = response[83:89]
TranslatedZoneKeys["ZEK(LMK)"] = response[89:122]
TranslatedZoneKeys["ZEK Check Value"] = response[122:128]
return TranslatedZoneKeys

In other words, you need to generate the same keys, but under your LMK and store them in your key database

Now whenever you get a request from your host with a mac you can validate the mac using the ZAK(LMK), and when you get encrypted values from your host you can translate the values using the ZPK(LMK)

So, when you respond to the key exchange process you put the check values in field 40. Your host will validate the check values, and then wait for you to send a request using your KEKs.

Here is an implementation using Python:

def __key_exchange_listen(self):
self.log.info("===== Key Exchange process Started =======")
self.s.settimeout(20.0)
length_indicator = self.s.recv(2)
if length_indicator == '':
self.log.critical('Received a blank length indicator from switch... might be a disconnect')
self.__setState("blank_response")
else:
size = struct.unpack('!H', length_indicator)[0]
d = datetime.now()
self.log.info(" Receiving Key Exchange Request = [%s]" % payload)
self.log.critical('Received a blank response from switch... might be a disconnect')
self.__setState("blank_response")
else:
iso_ans = AS2805(debug=False)
self.log.debug(iso_ans.dumpFields())

if iso_ans.getMTI() == '0820' and iso_ans.getBit(70) == '0101':
Value = iso_ans.getBit(48)
self.ZAK = Value[:32]
self.ZPK = Value[32:]

self.node_number = iso_ans.getBit(53)
log.info("Recieve Keys under ZMK : ZAK= %s, ZPK = %s" % (self.ZAK, self.ZPK ))

self.ZoneKeySet2 = KeyGenerator.Translate_a_Set_of_Zone_Keys(self.KEKr,ZPK=self.ZPK, ZAK=self.ZAK, ZEK='11111111111111111111111111111111')
cur = self.con_switch.cursor(MySQLdb.cursors.DictCursor)
sql = """UPDATE sessions_as2805 set
ZPK_LMK = '%s',
ZPK_ZMK = '%s',
ZPK_Check ='%s',
ZAK_LMK = '%s' ,
ZAK_ZMK = '%s',
ZAK_Check = '%s',
ZEK_LMK = '%s',
ZEK_Check = '%s',
keyset_number = '%s'
WHERE host_id = '%s' and keyset_description = 'Recieve' """ %\
(
self.ZoneKeySet2["ZPK(LMK)"],
self.ZPK,
self.ZoneKeySet2["ZPK Check Value"],
self.ZoneKeySet2["ZAK(LMK)"],
self.ZAK,
self.ZoneKeySet2["ZAK Check Value"],
self.ZoneKeySet2["ZEK(LMK)"],
self.ZoneKeySet2["ZEK Check Value"],
self.node_number,
self.host_id)
log.info("Recieve Keys under LMK : ZAK= %s, ZAK Check Value: %s ZPK = %s, ZPK Check Value: %s" % (self.ZoneKeySet2["ZAK(LMK)"], self.ZoneKeySet2["ZAK Check Value"], self.ZoneKeySet2["ZPK(LMK)"], self.ZoneKeySet2["ZPK Check Value"]))
cur.execute(sql)
self.log.debug("Records=%s" % (cur.rowcount,))
iso_req = AS2805(debug=False)
iso_req.setMTI('0830')
iso_req.setBit(7, iso_ans.getBit(7))
iso_req.setBit(11, iso_ans.getBit(11))
iso_req.setBit(33, iso_ans.getBit(33))
iso_req.setBit(39, '303')
iso_req.setBit(48, self.ZoneKeySet2["ZAK Check Value"] + self.ZoneKeySet2["ZPK Check Value"])
iso_req.setBit(53, iso_ans.getBit(53))
iso_req.setBit(70, iso_ans.getBit(70))
iso_req.setBit(100, iso_ans.getBit(100))
self.__storeISOMessage(iso_req, {"date_time_sent": d.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")})
try:

iso_send = iso_req.getNetworkISO()
iso_send_hex = ByteUtils.HexToByte(iso_send[2:])

self.log.debug(iso_req.dumpFields())
self.log.info("Sending Key Exchange Response = [%s]" % ReadableAscii(iso_send))
self.__send_message(iso_send_hex)
self.node_number = iso_ans.getBit(53)
except:
self.log.exception("key_exchange_failed")
self.__setState('key_exchange_failed')

finally:
cur.close()

These Keys are known as your SEND KEYS

So when you send a key exchange request you would need to generate a set of zone keys, this command on your HSM would look like this;

Where the KEKs is the KEKs that you generated from your components, and your output will be the following:

def Generate_a_Set_of_Zone_Keys(KEKs):
response = KeyClass.execute_get_a_Set_of_Zone_Keys(KEKs)
#print response
ZoneKeys = {}
ZoneKeys["ResponseCode"] = response[6:8]
ZoneKeys["ErrorCode"] = response[8:10]
if ZoneKeys["ErrorCode"] == '00':
ZoneKeys["ZPK(LMK)"] = response[10:43]
ZoneKeys["ZPK(ZMK)"] = response[43:76]
ZoneKeys["ZPK Check Value"] = response[76:82]
ZoneKeys["ZAK(LMK)"] = response[82:115]
ZoneKeys["ZAK(ZMK)"] = response[115:148]
ZoneKeys["ZAK Check Value"] = response[148:154]
ZoneKeys["ZEK(LMK)"] = response[154:187]
ZoneKeys["ZEK(ZMK)"] = response[187:220]
ZoneKeys["ZEK Check Value"] = response[220:226]
return ZoneKeys

Now when sending your  0820 request, you need to set field 40 as ZAK(ZMK) + ZPK(ZMK). Your host will do a Validation request (same as you did in step 1) and send you the check values. you need to compare this to the check values generated by your OI command, and if they match then you have successfully exchanged keys.

Below is an implementation using Python:

 def __keyExchange__(self):
self.__setState("key_exchange")

self.__key_exchange_listen()

cur = self.con_switch.cursor(MySQLdb.cursors.DictCursor)
d = datetime.now()
self.ZoneKeySet1 = {}
self.ZoneKeySet2 = {}
self.ZoneKeySet1 = KeyGenerator.Generate_a_Set_of_Zone_Keys(self.KEKs)

iso_req = AS2805(debug=False)
iso_req.setMTI('0820')
iso_req.setBit(7, d.strftime("%m%d%H%M%S"))
iso_req.setBit(11, self.__getNextStan())
iso_req.setBit(33, self.HostIIN)
iso_req.setBit(48, self.ZoneKeySet1["ZAK(ZMK)"][1:] + self.ZoneKeySet1["ZPK(ZMK)"][1:])
iso_req.setBit(53, self.node_number)
iso_req.setBit(70, '101')
self.__storeISOMessage(iso_req, {"date_time_sent": d.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")})
log.info("Send Keys under LMK : ZAK= %s, ZAK Check Value: %s ZPK = %s, ZPK Check Value: %s" % (self.ZoneKeySet1["ZAK(LMK)"], self.ZoneKeySet1["ZAK Check Value"], self.ZoneKeySet1["ZPK(LMK)"], self.ZoneKeySet1["ZPK Check Value"]))

try:

# send the Send Keys
iso_send = iso_req.getNetworkISO()
iso_send_hex = ByteUtils.HexToByte(iso_send[2:])

self.log.debug(iso_req.dumpFields())
self.log.info("Sending Key Exchange Request = [%s]" % ReadableAscii(iso_send))
self.__send_message(iso_send_hex)

self.s.settimeout(20.0)
length_indicator = self.s.recv(2)
if length_indicator == '':
self.log.critical('Received a blank length indicator from switch... might be a disconnect')
self.__setState("blank_response")
else:
size = struct.unpack('!H', length_indicator)[0]
d = datetime.now()
self.log.info(" Receiving Key Exchange Response = [%s]" % payload)
self.log.critical('Received a blank response from switch... might be a disconnect')
self.__setState("blank_response")
else:
iso_ans = AS2805(debug=False)
self.log.debug(iso_ans.dumpFields())

if iso_ans.getMTI() == '0830':
if iso_ans.getBit(39) == '3030':

Value = iso_ans.getBit(48)
self.KMACs_KVC = Value[:6]
self.KPEs_KVC = Value[6:]
#self.log.info("KMACs_KVC = %s, KPEs_KVC = %s" % (self.KMACs_KVC, self.KPEs_KVC))
if self.KMACs_KVC == self.ZoneKeySet1["ZAK Check Value"] and self.KPEs_KVC == self.ZoneKeySet1["ZPK Check Value"]:
self.log.info("0820 Key Exchange successful: Check Values Match, ZAK Check Value= %s , ZPK Check Value = %s" % (self.ZoneKeySet1["ZAK Check Value"], self.ZoneKeySet1["ZPK Check Value"]))
sql = """UPDATE sessions_as2805
SET
ZPK_LMK = '%s',
ZPK_ZMK = '%s',
ZPK_Check= '%s' ,
ZAK_LMK= '%s',
ZAK_ZMK = '%s',
ZAK_Check ='%s',
ZEK_LMK = '%s' ,
ZEK_ZMK = '%s',
ZEK_Check = '%s',
keyset_number = '%s'
WHERE host_id = '%s' and keyset_description = 'Send' """%\
( self.ZoneKeySet1["ZPK(LMK)"],
self.ZoneKeySet1["ZPK(ZMK)"],
self.ZoneKeySet1["ZPK Check Value"],
self.ZoneKeySet1["ZAK(LMK)"],
self.ZoneKeySet1["ZAK(ZMK)"],
self.ZoneKeySet1["ZAK Check Value"],
self.ZoneKeySet1["ZEK(LMK)"],
self.ZoneKeySet1["ZEK(ZMK)"],
self.ZoneKeySet1["ZEK Check Value"],
self.node_number,
self.host_id)

cur.execute(sql)
self.log.debug("Records=%s" % (cur.rowcount,))
self.__setState("key_exchanged")

self.__setState('session_key_ok')
self.log.info("==== Key Exchange Sequence Completed Successfully====")
self.last_key_exchange = datetime.now()

else:
self.log.error("Generate_a_Set_of_Zone_Keys: KVC Check Failed!!")
else:
self.log.error("0820 Response Code = %s, Key Exchange Failed" % (iso_ans.getBit(39)))
except InvalidAS2805, ii:
self.log.error(ii)
self.s.close()
self.s = None
self.__setState("session_key_fail")
except:
self.log.exception("key_exchange_failed")
self.__setState('key_exchange_failed')



Now that keys have successfully been exchanged, you can start submitting transactions.

When sending transactions encrypt data (pin / field) Send Keys, and when receiving data translate / decrypt using your receive keys, Generate MAC using Send MAC and Verify using Receive MAC.

• TAK – Your key to generate and verify MACs
• TEK – Your key to encrypt data and decrypt / translate

This concludes the implementation of Node to Node interfaces using AS2805 Standards.

Easy as Pie!

Standard

# Typical Cryptography in AS2805 Explained

Key Management conforms to AS 2805 part 6.1.

### KEK Establishment

Each interchange node contains an Interchange Send Key Encrypting Key (KEKs) and an Interchange Receive Key Encrypting Key (KEKr). The Interchange Send KEK is the same key as the Interchange Receive KEK in the partnering node, similarly the Interchange Receive KEK is the same as the Interchange Send KEK in the partnering node.

The Interchange Key Encrypting Keys are used to encipher and decipher the session keys when they are transmitted between the nodes and in the proof of end points process.

Interchange Key Encrypting Keys is statistically unique and shall be changed, at a minimum, once every two years.

 Node A Node B KEKs = KEKr KEkr = KEKs

### Session Keys

Each node keeps four sets of session keys, two send sets and two receive sets.

Each set of session keys consists of two keys, MAC Key, PIN Protect Key. Each session key is 128-bits long and stored in a secure manner.

The send session key sets are generated by the sending node and numbered “1” or “2”. The send session key sets are then forwarded to the receiving node to be used as the receive session key sets.

The receive session key sets are received in a 0820 Network Management Advice message with bit ‘070’ equal to 101 from the sending node. The set number of either “1” or “2” contained in bit 53 indicates the receive session key set used by the receiving node to verify the MAC, decipher the data and translate or verify the PIN.

One set of send session keys is used at a time and all Transactions sent from the sending node will generate the MAC and encipher the PIN, if present, using the MAC Generator Key and PIN Protect Key, respectively, from the same send session key set. The send session key set used is indicated by bit 53 (contains “1” or “2”) in each message. Session Keys must be statistically unique and replaced, at a minimum, once every hour or on every 256 Transactions, whichever occurs first.

 Node A Node B Send Session Keys Set 1 Receive Session Keys Set 1 MAC Key (KMACs1) = MAC Verification Key (KMACr1) PIN Protect Key (KPEs1) = PIN Protect Key (KPEr1) Send Session Keys Set 2 Receive Session Keys Set 2 MAC Key (KMACs2) = MAC Verification Key (KMACr2) PIN Protect Key (KPEs2) = PIN Protect Key (KPEr2) Receive Session Keys Set 1 Send Session Keys Set 1 MAC Verification Key (KMACr1) = MAC Key (KMACs1) PIN Protect Key (KPEr1) = PIN Protect Key (KPEs1) Receive Session Keys Set 2 Send Session Keys Set 2 MAC Verification Key (KMACr2) = MAC Key (KMACs2) PIN Protect Key (KPEr2) = PIN Protect Key (KPEs2)

When enciphered for transmission, each session key type will use a unique variant of the Key Enciphering Key in accordance with AS 2805 part 6.1 request response (logon) from the other before starting any other message exchange. When ready to logon, a party should attempt to logon and continue to attempt to logon until a successful response has been received. Upon receipt of an unsolicited logon (i.e. receiving a logon message when in an assumed logged on state) or a message with a response code indicating an irrecoverable error, a party should send an immediate logoff message and attempts to logon should be made as soon as possible. All logon response messages should be inspected to ensure that the response code indicates a successful logon

### Changing Session keys

While one set of send session keys is being used, the other send session key set is randomly generated by the sending node and their KVCs generated, the keys are then enciphered under the Interchange Send KEK and transmitted to the receiving node in a 0820 Network Management Advice message.

When a 0820 message is received by the receiving node, the session keys are deciphered using the Interchange Receive KEK. These deciphered keys are set up as the set of receive keys specified by the set number contained in bit 53 of the 0820 message. The Key Verification Codes (KVCs) are calculated by the receiving node and transmitted to the sending node in bit 48 of the 0830 message.

When the 0830 Network Management Advice response message is received at the node initiating the key change, the KVCs contained in the 0830 message are validated. If the KVCs are correct, the new send session key set can be used immediately. If the KVCs are invalid, new send session key set must be generated and the whole process is repeated.

### Sign off

Either node may terminate the transmission of financial messages by sending a Sign Off Advice. A Sign Off is accomplished by the transmission of a 0820 Network Management Advice Message with a NMIC (Bit 70) equal to ‘002’.

### Key change during normal processing

A session key change can occur at any time; each node independently initiates the change of their send keys. The sender will advise their sending session keys to the receiver using a 0820 Network Management Advice message with a NMIC equal to ‘101’ indicating key change. Once a valid response (0830 message) is received and the KVCs confirmed, the new keys can be used.

Standard

# Thales 9000 with AS2805 Interchange & RSA EFTPOS Commands.

### Interchange Cryptographic Keys

Interchange keys are used to protect financial transactions initiated at Acquirer eftpos / ATM Terminals while in transit to the Issuer institution. Interchange keys may be either:

(a) PIN encrypting keys – used to protect the customer PIN from the point of origin to the point of authorisation. PIN encrypting keys are a specific instance of session keys;

(b) Session keys – used to secure, validate and protect the financial message. Session keys can be further qualified into those used in the terminal to Acquirer environment (terminal session keys) or on node to node links (interchange session keys);

(c) Key Encrypting Keys (KEK) – used to protect other keys (e.g. session keys) during exchange; or

(d) Transport Keys – used to protect keys (e.g. KEKs) during transport to the partner institution.

### Cryptographic Algorithms

DEA3 and DEA2 are the only approved algorithms for the protection of interchange information (full details of these algorithms may be found in the Australian standard AS 2805 part 5).

DEA3 keys are 128 bits in length (effectively 112 bits) and are generally referred to as triple DES or 3DES keys (the corresponding encryption algorithm is specified in AS 2805 part 5.4). Triple DES may also be acceptably implemented using a key length of 192 bits (effectively 168 bits).

DEA3 with a key length of 128 bits and DEA2 with key lengths equal to, or greater than 2048 bits are the minimum acceptable requirements for the effective protection of interchange information at the time of the issuance of this document.

In accordance with AS 2805 part 3, DEA3 must be used for PIN encipherment.

For all Interchange Links, Issuers and Acquirers must ensure that:

(a) Security for Transactions processed over that Interchange Link complies with AS2805 Part 6;

(b) Message formats comply with AS2805 Part 2;

(c) Security of transactions from terminal to Acquirer and from Acquirer to Issuer complies with AS2805 Part 6;

(d) PIN security and encryption complies with AS2805 Parts 3 and 5.4;

(e) Key management practices comply with AS2805 Part 6.1;

In each case and as more particularly set out in Part 8:

(a) Message Authentication must apply to all Interchange Links;

(b) The Message Authentication Code (MAC) must be calculated using, as a minimum, a DEA 3 (128-bit) key, Triple DES and an algorithm conforming to AS2805 Part 4; and

(c) all interchange PIN and MAC cryptographic functions must be performed within a Tamper-responsive SCM

### The Actual process using an Thales 9000 HSM (CECS Approved)

Now what we are clear on the actual requirements of CECS and APCA, lets  attempt to do this using  a Thales 9000.

Generate a Sponsor RSA key pair

This command is the first step as would be required to do this for all terminal commands.

• This is done my using the HSM EI host Command, from the HSM base manual.
• The input is the length of the RSA key set required,  and the length go the public key modulus.
• The Public Key Verification Code should now be generated. This is done using the HSM H2 Command from the Australian Standards Support Manual.

The Public Key and the PVC are sent to your Interchange Partner via different paths, as per their direction. (lets call this OUR-Key and OUR-PVC)

Your Interchange partner will now do the same process and provide you with a Public Key and a PVC. (lets call this THEIR-Key and THEIR-PVC)

When we receive this Public Key from our Interchange Partner, the following should happen:

• The PVC for the Key should be generated using the HSM H2 Command from the Australian Standards Support Manual.
• The MAC for the Key should be generated using the HSM EO command from the HSM Base Manual.

We now have public keys exchanged and have them ready for use!!

Our Database should be looking like this:

|OUR-Key|OUR-PVC|THEIR-Key|THEIR-PVC|THEIR-MAC|GEN-PVC|

Now we have the Public keys exchanged and ready for use, we can generate our KEKs & send to Interchange Partner, and receive our KEKr from Interchange Partner;

• To send our KEKs we will use the H4 command from the Australian Standards support manual.
• To receive our KEKr we will use the H6 command from the Australian Standards support manual.

Once these are decrypted and stored in our key database we can generate and exchange our session MAC and PIN keys.

• To generate and store our send keys we use the OI command from the Australian Standards support manual.
• To receive and store our receive keys we use the OK command from the Australian Standards support manual.

Now we have all the keys in place we can start to process transactions.

• To generate the MAC on a message there are a number of commands available, however as we are using the AS2805 standards we always recommend our customers use the C2 command from the Australian Standards support manual. This provides all the options required for the Australian environment.

Similarly to verify the MAC on a message there are a number of commands available, however as we are using the AS2805 standards we always recommend our customers use the C4 command from the Australian Standards support manual. This provides all the options required for the Australian environment.

#### Terminal Commands

Terminal Manufacturer will be injecting into the PINpads their Manufacturer Public Key. The MPK will be transmitted to SPONSOR securely. The MPK validity should be checked by verifying the PVC, this is achieved by generating a Public Key Verification Code This is done using the H2 command from the Australian Standards support manual. And the two values compared.

• We also need to generate a PPASN, this is achieved using the AS2805 PK command.
• The host will now send the SPK to the PINpad, the PINpad will now generate the KI (also known as KTI), and send to the host. This is recovered using the AS2805 host H8 command, which also returns the KCA, the KCA is encrypted under the LMK and the KTI.
• Now we have the MPK and have verified it is genuine, we now need to generate a MAC for the Public Key, this is achieved using the Host EO command, this is used in subsequent processing. Note: this command is only available when the HSM is in Authorised State. We can now recover the PINpad Public from the MSK. This is achieved using the AS2805 H0 host command.
• KCA is now used to create the TMK1 and TMK2 (also known as KEK1 & KEK2). These are generated using the C0 command.
• Now we have the TMK’s in place we can use the TMK update commands.

Updating the Keys

• When updating only TMK1 the AS2805 OU command is used.
• When updating both TMK1 and TMK2 then the OW command is used.

Now we have the TMK’s in place and able to be updated, we can generate the Session Keys to be used for the PIN, MAC & optional encryption keys if required.

This is achieved using the AS2805 PI command. The PI command will generate the PIN, MAC, and optional Encryption keys.

• Now we can have the session keys in place we can Decrypt the data, verify the MAC & verify the pin. The decrypt data & verify MAC steps depend on how it has been handled by the terminal. Has the terminal done the MAC first then encrypted the required data or has the terminal encrypted the data & then done the MAC. We have assumed that the Encrypt was done first.
• Verify the MAC’s on the transactions from the terminal using the AS2805 C4.
• Once the MAC has been verified we can then decrypt the required data with the AS2805 host command PW.
• Now we have the required decrypted data you will need to either verify the PIN or Translate the PIN, to translate the PIN assuming the transaction is a debit card transaction. This is achieved using the AS2805 PO host command. To verify the PIN will use one of the following F0 or F2.

If you have translated the PIN we can form the message and generate a MAC for the message to be sent to Interchange Partner, this is achieved using the C2 command as detailed above in the Interchange messages.

The biggest problem we see with this are around the KEKs & KEKr is people get them around the wrong way. Your KEKs becomes the remote KEKr & vice versa. The AS2805 commands are designed to swap them over automatically.

The other gotcha is we split the terminal side & the interchange side of the HSM, TMK (terminal master key) is like a KEK (ZMK (Zone master key)) but used on the terminal side of the network where a ZMK (KEKs & KEKr) is used for interchange side of the network.

easy as Pie!

Standard
Uncategorized

This is part five of a series on the Random Oracle Model. See here for the previous posts: Part 1: An introduction Part 2: The ROM formalized, a scheme and a proof sketch Part 3: How we abuse the ROM to make our security proofs work Part 4: Some more examples of where the ROM […]

# What is the random oracle model and why should you care? (Part 5) — A Few Thoughts on Cryptographic Engineering

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Uncategorized

A few days ago I had the pleasure of hosting Kenny Paterson, who braved snow and historic cold (by Baltimore standards) to come talk to us about encrypted databases. Kenny’s newest result is with first authors Paul Grubbs, Marie-Sarah Lacharité and Brice Minaud (let’s call it GLMP). It isn’t so much about building encrypted databases, as it […]

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Cryptography

# From Bi-Linear Maps to Searchable Encryption

## Pairings-Based Cryptography

### Introduction

Theoretical research into pairings-based cryptography has been a well-researched area over the last few years, this cryptography scheme is based on the mapping of two cryptographical groups which allows for a new cryptographical scheme based on a trapdoor permutation between the groups with some interesting complexity properties.

These two groups are called a Gap Groups in many instances, where the Decisional Diffie-Helman problem is easy, but the Computational Diffie-Helman still is hard to solve. Weil and Tate pairings are used in implementations but requires complex mathematics, this is why in this section we will use a slightly more abstract means to explain bilinear maps..

### Bilinear Maps

Mostly all constructions of pairings-based cryptosystems use bilinear maps, for this we consider two groups $G_1$ and $G_2$ or a prime order $q$. We can denote $G_1$ using additive notation and $G_2$ using multiplicative notation, even as the group operations of $G_1$ and $G_2$ are very different, $G_1$ can also be written as a multiplicative group operation in some literature.

If we consider two generators of group $G_1$ as $\ P$ and $Q$, we can write:

$aP\ =\ P+P+\ ..P\ \}\ a$ times

Using this we can also consider a map $e$ as follows: ${e:\ G}_1\ \times G_1\ \to \ \ G_2$

This type of bilinear map has a main group $G_1$ and a shadow group $G_2$ where we map two group elements in the first group to the second group would need have properties between them in order for it to be useful,  Bilinearity, non-degenerate and computable.

Bilinearity:

For Group $G_1$ using generators $P$ and $\ Q$ we can define a map to $G_2$, where the additive operation in group $G_1$ equals the multiplicative operation in $G_2$:

$\forall P,\ Q\in G_1, \forall a,\ b\ \in {\mathbb{Z}}^*_q,$
$Map:e\left(aP,\ bQ\right)=e(P,\ Q)^{ab}$

If G1 and G2 where both multiplicative groups then the Bilinearity property would be the following:

• $\forall P,\ Q\in G_1,\ \forall a,\ b\ \in {\mathbb{Z}}^*_q,$
• $Map:e\left(P^a,\ Q^b\right)=e(P,\ Q)^{ab}$

This has an interesting property whereby it beaks the decisional Diffie-Helman problem, but this will be discussed in more details later.

Non-Degeneracy:

If all the elements map to the identity of the group then if would not have any additional computational aspects to explore. It is therefore important not to create a map with the identity of either of the groups.
$\forall P\ \in G_1,\ P\ \neq 0\ \ \left\langle e\left(P,\ P\right)\right\rangle =G_2\ (e\left(P,\ P\right)\ generates\ G_2)$
Such that: $P\ \neq 0\ \Rightarrow e\left(P,\ P\right)\neq 1$

Computability: $e$ should be efficiently computable, there are some constructions of maps that are hard to compute.

The construction of these bilinear pairs has been proven by Wei and Tate pairings, where $G_1$ is a typical elliptic curve group, and $G_2$ is a finite field. These have proven to provide complex problems across these groups to construct cryptographical schemes.

### Complex Problems

For the usage of bilinear maps in cryptographical schemes, we define a one-way function using two problems, the Decisional Diffie-Helman problem and the discrete log problem.

Theorem 1: The Discrete Log Problem in $G_1$ is no harder than the Discrete Log Problem in $G_2$.

Proof 1: If we use our additive notation and consider that $Q\ =\ aP$, we then need to solve $a$, which is random, for a given $P$ and a random $Q$
$e\left(P,\ Q\right)=e\left(P,\ aP\right)=e(P,\ P)^a$

With this we can effectively reduce the Discrete Log Problem in $G_1$ to the Discrete Log Problem in $G_2$, if we are given $P\in G_1$ and a random $Q\in G_1$ then the mapping of $e$ is easily computable by calculating ${{log}_P (Q)}$ as:

$P^=e(P,\ P)$
$Q^=e(P,\ Q)$
$a=\ {{log}_{P^} \left(Q^\right)\ in\ \ G_2\ }$
$a={{log}_P (Q)\ }\ in\ G_1$

With this we can see that the difficulty of solving the discrete log problem in both groups are the same, since the computation of ${{log}_P (Q)\ }$ have the same complexity in both groups.

Theorem 2: The Decisional Diffie-Helman is easy in $G_1$.

Proof 2: Solving the Decisional Diffie-Helman problem in $G_1$ requires distinguishing between:

$\langle P,\ aP,\ bP,\ cP \rangle \ with\ a,\ b,\ c\ \in {\mathbb{Z}}^*_q$ and
$\langle P,\ aP,\ bP,\ abP \rangle \in {\mathbb{Z}}^*_q$
If we can define $P,A,B$ and $C$ as the distinguishers four values, then the distinguisher function is as follows:

$v_1=Map:e(A,\ B)\ and\ v_2=Map:e(P,\ C)$

If we have that $v_1=v_2$, then the tuple is of type $\langle P,\ aP,\ bP,\ abP\rangle$

From this we can take $C=\ abP$ from (Theorem 1)

$e(A,\ B)=e(aP,\ bP)$
$=e(P,\ P)^{ab}$
$=e(P,\ abP)$
$=e(P,\ C)$

Since the map $e$ is non-degenerate we can set $e\left(A,\ B\right)=e(P,\ C)$ equivalent to $c\ =ab$. The distinguisher has thus a significant advantage given the mapping $e$ to decide the Decisional Diffie-Helman problem.

Theorem 3 The Bilinear Diffie-Helman Problem is easy in $G_1$ but difficult in $G_2$

Fact: If we are given two groups $G_1$ and $G_2$ with a map between them as $e$, there are no polynomial time algorithm that can compute $\left(P,\ aP,\ bP,\ cP\right)for\ \ some\ a,\ b,\ c\ \in \ {\mathbb{Z}}^*_q$ in $G_1$ given $e(P,\ P)^{abc}$ in $G_2$. With this we can construct the following properties between the groups as the following hard problems:

$e(aP,\ bP)^c\ in\ G_1=e(P,\ P)^{abc}\ in\ G_2$
$e(aP,\ cP)^b\ in\ G_1=e(P,\ P)^{abc}\ in\ G_2$
$e(bP,\ cP)^a\ in\ G_1=e(P,\ P)^{abc}\ in\ G_2$

Using these theories, we can now construct cryptosystems based on these hard problems found in these groups.

### Cryptography Schemes

Using these complexity problems, there has been an abundance of cryptosystems developed over the years, where the two most notable are the 3-party key agreement scheme, identity based encryption and searchable encryption.

#### The 3-party Diffie-Helman key agreement scheme

Joux  introduced in 2000 a three-party key agreement scheme using bilinear maps utilizing the Bilinear Diffie-Helman problem for the construction.

If we have two groups $G_1$ and $G_2$ with $P$ as a generator of $G_1$, and three parties $A,\ B,\ C$ that have respective secrets $a,\ b,\ c\ \in \ {\mathbb{Z}}^*_q$ we can construct a key agreement scheme where each party shares a secret key as follows:
$A\ \longrightarrow B,\ C:aP$
$B\ \longrightarrow A,\ C:bP$
$C\ \longrightarrow A,\ B:cP$

Using the Bilinear Diffie-Helman Problem we can define the following:

$A$ computes $e(bP,\ cP)^a=e(P,\ P)^{abc}$
$B$ computes $e(aP,\ cP)^b=e(P,\ P)^{abc}$
$C$ computes $e(aP,\ bP)^c=e(P,\ P)^{abc}$

All parties now have the same shared key $K=e(P,\ P)^{abc}\ \in G_2$ that can be used as an input to a symmetric encryption scheme.

#### Identity Based Encryption

The idea of using private information, like an email address, as a public key has been long debated and researched, whereby the corresponding private key can be delivered to the rightful owner. The role of the key generator must be to verify the private information before distributing the private key to the owner, although a public key infrastructure would solve this problem, there were substantial research into this area to move away from a trusted third party, and having the identity as part of the encryption.

In Dan Boneh’s and Franklin’s paper an Identity based encryption scheme was created to remove the public key infrastructure with the use of bilinear maps and the bilinear Diffie-Helman problem, incorporating a random oracle model. This protocol consists out of five phases:

Setup

• Defining two groups $G_1$ and $G_2$ with a bilinear map $e:G_{1\ }\times G_1\ \to \ G_2$ and $P$ as a generator
• A System wide secret key $s\in \ {\mathbb{Z}}^*_q$
• A corresponding system wide public key $P_{pub}=sP$, which are not distributed
• Public hash function $H_1:\{0,\ 1{\}}^*\ \to G^*_1$, a random oracle
• Public hash function $H_2:G_2\ \to \{0,\ 1{\}}^n$ for some fixed $n$, the second random oracle.
• The message space $\mathcal{M}=\{0,\ 1{\}}^n$
• The cypher space $C=G^*_1\ \times \{0,\ 1{\}}^n$

To create a private key for a corresponding participant for $ID\in \{0,1{\}}^*$ the system computes:

$Q_{ID}=H_1(ID)$ and
$d_{ID}=\ {sQ}_{ID}$ which is the private key that can be distributes to the user.

Encryption:
If we are now given a message $m\ \in \mathcal{M}$ we can compute the cyphertext as follows:

• $Q_{ID}=H_1\left(ID\right)\in G^*_1$
• We then choose a random $r\in \ {\mathbb{Z}}^*_q$
• We can now compute $g_{ID}=e\left(Q_{ID},\ P_{pub}\right)\in G_2$
• And create the cyphertext: $c=(rP,\ m\oplus H_2(g^r_{ID}))$

Decryption:

When the user receives the cyphertext, he has $c=(u,\ v)\in C$ and can decrypt it using his corresponding private key $d_{ID}$ and $H_2$

$m=v\oplus H_2(e(d_{ID},\ u))$

The main reason that both encryption and decryption works are because of the properties of pairings and the mask generated by $H_2$ that is xor’ed with the plaintext. We can prove the correctness by using simple substitution from the parameters above:

$m=v\oplus H_2(e(d_{ID},\ u))$
$m=v\oplus H_2(e(sH_1(ID)\ ,\ rP))$
$m=v\oplus H_2(e(H_1(ID)\ ,\ P))^{rs}$
$m=v\oplus H_2(e(Q_{ID}\ ,\ sP))^r$
$m=v\oplus H_2(e(Q_{ID}\ ,\ P_{pub}))^r$
$m=v\oplus H_2(g^r_{ID}$)
$m=(m\oplus H_2 (g^r_{ID}))\oplus H_2(g^r_{ID}))$

$=m$

This scheme provides us a way to use the identity as a parameter within the encryption and decryption without the use of a third party. The usage of identity is important, as this can bind the encryption and decryption to a owner of the keys.

## Searchable Encryption

Searchable encryption schemes are a well-studied topic, and there have been several constructions using order revealing and order preserving schemes. For the a simplified construction a protocol I have chosen to use an order revealing encryption schemes based on bilinear maps, this construction  is proven to be secure against adaptively chosen keyword attacks assuming the bilinear Diffie-Helman problem is intractable using the random oracle model.

To use this construction , we will look at the following scenario:

For this scenario, we need to define four entities that will be involved in the scheme:

• Users (1..n): responsible for the creation of messages that are sent to a trusted party for routing. These messages are sent and received via a secure channel to the messaging server.
• Third Party / Message Server: The messaging platform, that routes messages to users, and that can test weather a certain list of keywords are present in the message.
• Legal Authority (1..n): The party interested in searching the message data.
• Trusted Third Party: a Party responsible for securing the private key

Suppose a Legal authority needs to be alerted when certain keywords are transmitted to a messaging server. For example, a user sends a message to another user that he is planning a bombing, the “bombing” needs to create an alert on the messaging server, and the legal authority needs to be sent a encryption of the message thread.

If the messages between the users are encrypted using semantic means, then the messaging server cannot make any alerting decisions as it cannot decrypt the messages. Our goal here is to ensure that the messaging server provide a way to test whether a keyword has been transmitted between the users, without revealing the content of the messages. This can only be achievable by the legal authority providing a list of keywords to the message server that can be used, as well messaging server needs to have access to both the encryption and decryption key of the user’s messages.

To do so, a user encrypts messages between users and messaging server using a standard public key cryptosystem and saves it in his database. The messages are appended with a Public-Key Encryption with keyword Search (PKS) of each keyword. For example, User Steve sends Peter a message $M$ with words $W_1$, $W_2..W_m$, then the trusted messaging server create:
$E_{A_{pub}}(Message)\ \parallel PKS(A_{pub},\ W_1)\parallel \dots \parallel PKS(A_{pub},\ W_m)$
Where $\parallel$ denotes concatenation and $E_{A_{pub}}$ is the public key of the legal authority (Alice). The reason for this form of encryption is so that the legal authority can provide a trapdoor $T_w$ to the messaging server to test whether a certain keyword has been used. Given a searchable encryption for a keyword $PKS(A_{pub},\ \ W^)$ and a trapdoor $T_w$ the messaging server can determine is $W=W^$ , if it’s the case that $W\neq W^$ then the messaging server does not learn any information about the word. It’s also quite interesting to note that this is not a very communitive scheme, as the searchable encryption (PKS) is constructed only using the public key of the legal authority.

### Definitions

Throughout this section we will refer to a negligible function as $f\mathrm{:}\mathrm{\ }\mathbb{R}\to \mathrm{[}0,\ 1]$ where $f\left(s\right)<1/g(s)$ for any polynomial $g$ and sufficiently large $s$. I will start by defining a searchable public key encryption scheme (PKS) where the public key refers to the cyphertext created by the messaging server  using the public key of the legal authority , and the searchable encryption scheme (PKS) does not reveal any information about the message.

Our goal is to enable the legal authority to send a short secret key ($T_w$) for a specific word to the messaging server, so that the messaging server can locate all messages that have this keyword without revealing the word $W$. The secret key ($T_w$) produced by the legal authority is based on the private key, and the messaging server send the message containing the words back to the legal authority, encrypted using the corresponding public key.

Definition 1.1: The following polynomial time randomized algorithms are part of a non-interactive searchable encryption scheme (PKS).

• $KeyGen(s)$: For a security parameter $s$ a corresponding public/private key pair is generated ($A_{priv},\ A_{pub})$ by the legal authority and the public key is sent to the messaging server.
• $PKS(A_{pub},\ W)$: For a word $W$ in the message, a searchable encryption (PKS) is generated using the public key $A_{pub}$ of the legal authority. We will denote the $PKS$ function as $S$
• $Trapdoor(A_{priv},\ W)$: Given the private key of the legal authority, a certain word $W$ produces a trapdoor $T_w$.
• $Test(A_{pub},\ S,\ T_W)$: Given the public key of the legal authority $A_{pub},\ \$and a searchable encryption $S$ on the messaging server, a trapdoor $T_w$ outputs yes’ if $W=W'$

The legal authority will run the $KeyGen$ algorithm and generate its public/ private key pairs, and then use the $Trapdoor$ function to generate a series of trapdoors for words $W_1..\ W_i$ that it wants to search for. The messaging server will then use the $Test$ function to determine whether a given message has a keyword $W_i$.

### Construction

For the definition above I will provide an efficient construction using bilinear maps based on a variant of the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption with identity based encryption

We will use two groups $G_1,\ G_2$ of prime order $p$ and a bilinear map $e:G_1\times G_1\to G_2$ between the two groups. This map satisfies the following three properties where the size of $G_1$ and $G_2$ is determined by a security parameter:

• Computable: If you are given two elements in $G_1$ as $g,\ h$ then there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute the map $e(g,\ h)$ in $G_2$
• Bilinear: for all integers in the prime order, we have a map $e(g^x,\ g^y)$ = $e(g,\ g)^{xy}$
• Non-degenerate: if $g$ is a generator of $G_1$ then the map $e(g,\ g)$ is a generator of $G_2$

From this we can build a non-interactive searchable encryption scheme based on bilinear maps. For this we will need two hash function, or random oracles in each group as:

$H_1:\{0,\ 1{\}}^*\to G_1$ and $H_2:G_2\to \{0,\ 1{\}}^{{log p\ }}$

Based on definition 1.1 we will construct the scheme using the same model based on the Dan Boneh Searchable Encryption Scheme:

• $KeyGen(s)$: The security parameter $s$ determines the size of the prime order $p$ of the groups $G_1$and $G_2$. The legal authority then also selects a random $\alpha \in {\mathbb{Z}}^*_p$ and a generator $g$ of $G_1$. The Output is a public key $A_{pub}=[g,\ h=g^{\alpha }]$ and a private key $\alpha$. The public key is then distributed to the messaging server.
• $PKS(A_{pub},\ W)$: Using the public key and a word $W$, the messaging server computes a bilinear map $t\ =e(H_1(W),\ h^r)\in G_2$ using the random oracle and a random $r\in {\mathbb{Z}}^*_p$. Then outputs a searchable encryption $PKS(A_{pub},\ W)=[g^r,\ H_2(t)]$.
• $Trapdoor(A_{priv},\ W)$: The legal authority uses the random oracle and its private key to generate a trapdoor $T_w=H_1(W)^{\alpha }\in G_1$
• $Test(A_{pub},\ S,\ T_W)$: When the messaging server receives a Test function from the legal authority as $S=[A,\ B]$ it can test if $H_2(e(T_w,\ A))=B$

The construction of the scheme can be viewed as a derivative of Identity Based Encryption with a limited number of identities. Using this scheme, the messaging server needs to have the ability to create an index of the words that’s exchanged between the users of the system that can be tested. Unfortunately, this construction has several issues relating to the sharing of the creation of the trapdoor function. None the less, the use of bi-linear maps and hash functions allows us to identify encrypted words without revealing what they actually are.

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Cryptography

# Mutual Authentication using Certificates

Mutual SSL authentication or certificate based mutual authentication refers to two parties authenticating each other through verifying the provided digital certificate so that both parties are assured of the others’ identity. In technology terms, it refers to a client (ATM) authenticating themselves to a server (Switch) and that server also authenticating itself to the client through verifying the public key certificate/digital certificate issued by the trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs).

Because authentication relies on digital certificates, certification authorities and Certificate Server are an important part of the mutual authentication process. From a high-level point of view, the process of authenticating and establishing an encrypted channel using certificate-based mutual authentication involves the following steps in TLS:

2. The server presents its certificate to the client.
3. The client verifies the server’s certificate.
4. If successful, the client sends its certificate to the server.
5. The server verifies the client’s credentials.
6. If successful, the server grants access to the protected resource requested by the client.

## TLS Mutual Authentication Handshake

The TLS handshake firstly agrees the protocol to be used by both parties, then exchanges certificates and validates the signatures on each certificates. Below are more detailed steps explaining the handshake.

1. The TLS client sends a “client hello” message that lists cryptographic information such as the SSL or TLS version and, in the client’s order of preference, the CipherSuites supported by the client. The message also contains a random byte string that is used in subsequent computations. The protocol allows for the “client hello” to include the data compression methods supported by the client.
2. The TLS server responds with a “server hello” message that contains the CipherSuite chosen by the server from the list provided by the client, the session ID, and another random byte string. The server also sends its digital certificate. The server sends a “client certificate request” that includes a list of the types of certificates supported and the Distinguished Names of acceptable Certification Authorities (CAs).
3. The TLS client verifies the server’s digital certificate.
4. The TLS client sends the random byte string that enables both the client and the server to compute the secret key to be used for encrypting subsequent message data. The random byte string itself is encrypted with the server’s public key.
5. If the TLS server sent a “client certificate request”, the client sends a random byte string encrypted with the client’s private key, together with the client’s digital certificate, or a “no digital certificate alert”. This alert is only a warning, but we will not be allowing transactions without a client certificate.
6. The TLS server verifies the client’s certificate.
7. The TLS client sends the server a “finished” message, which is encrypted with the secret key, indicating that the client part of the handshake is complete.
8. The TLS server sends the client a “finished” message, which is encrypted with the secret key, indicating that the server part of the handshake is complete.
9. For the duration of the TLS session, the server and client can now exchange messages that are symmetrically encrypted with the shared secret key.

In order to have a clear understanding of public key cryptography and digital signatures, the following section provides a high level overview of the encryption scheme using mutual authentication and certificate authorities.

## Public-key certificate scheme Basics

In this section we use Alice and Bob as two parties that exchange messages, Oscar is a malicious user trying to decrypt and steal data.

The underlying problem with normal RSA is that the server has no real proof of who its communicating to. If a server is issuing public keys to all parties, how can it identify each individual user and ensue the public keys belong to valid users? Public certificates are also susceptible to Man in the Middle Attacks (MIM) where Oscar can pretend to be Alice and the server have not way of knowing.

Message authentication ensures that the sender of a message is authentic. However, in the scenario at hand Bob receives a public key which is supposedly Alice’s, but he has no way of knowing whether that is in fact the case. To make this point clear, let’s examine how a key of a user Alice would look in practice:

kA = (kpub,A,IDA)

,where IDA is identifying information, e.g., Alice’s IP address or her name together with date of birth. The actual public key kpub,A, however, is a mere binary string,  e.g., 2048 bit. If Oscar performs a MIM attack, he would change the key to:

kA = (kpub,O,IDA)

Since everything is unchanged except the anonymous actual bit string, the receiver will not be able to detect that it is in fact Oscar’s. This observation has far-reaching consequences which can be summarized as: Even though public-key schemes do not require a secure channel; they require authenticated channels for the distribution of the public keys.

The idea behind certificates and authenticated channels is quite easy: Since the authenticity of the message (kpub,A,IDA)is violated by an active Man in the middle attack, we apply a cryptographic mechanism that provides authentication. More specifically, we use digital signatures. Thus, a certificate for a user Alice in its most basic form is the following structure where IDA is identifying information like a terminal id or serial number:

CertA = [(kpub,A,IDA), sigkpr (kpub,A,IDA)]

The idea is that the receiver of a certificate verifies the signature prior to using the certificate, and both the client and the server validates the signature before using the public key. The signature protects the signed message which is the structure (kpub,A,IDA) in this case—against manipulation. If Oscar attempts to replace kpub,A by kpub,O it will be detected. Thus, it is said that certificates bind the identity of a user to their public key.

Certificates require that the receiver has the correct verification key, which is a public key. If we were to use Alice’s public key for this, we would have the same problem that we are actually trying to solve and Oscar can impersonate Alice. Instead, the signatures for certificates are provided by a mutually trusted third party. This party is called the Certification Authority commonly abbreviated as CA. It is the task of the CA to generate and issue certificates for all users in the system.

For certificate generation, we can distinguish between two main cases. In the first case, the user computes her own asymmetric key pair and merely requests the CA to sign the public key, as shown in the following simple protocol for a user named Alice:

Table 1 Certificate Generation with User-Provided Keys

 Description Alice Request / Response CA Alice generates a public private key pair generate kpr,A, kpub,A Sends this to the CA RQST(kpub,A,IDA)→ CA verifies Alice’s identity verify IDA CA signs Alice public key with its private key sA = sigkpr ,CA(kpub,A,IDA) CA creates a certificate (public private key pair) with its signature CertA = [(kpub,A,IDA), sA] Certificate is distributed to Alice for usage ←CertA

From a security point of view, the first transaction is crucial. It must be assured that Alice’s message (kpub,A, IDA) is sent via an authenticated channel. Otherwise, Oscar could request a certificate in Alice’s name.

In practice it is often advantageous that the CA not only signs the public keys but also generates the public–private key pairs for each user. In this case, a basic protocol looks like this:

Table 2 Certificate Generation with CA-Generated Keys

 Description Alice Request / Response CA Alice request certificate request certificate Sends this to the CA −RQST(,IDA)→ CA verifies Alice’s identity verify IDA CA generates new certificate generate kpr,A, kpub,A CA signs Alice public key with its private key sA = sigkpr ,CA(kpub,A,IDA) CA creates a certificate (public private key pair) with its signature CertA = [(kpub,A,IDA), sA] Certificate is distributed to Alice for usage ←CertA

For the first transmission, an authenticated channel is needed. In other words: The CA must be assured that it is really Alice who is requesting a certificate, and not Oscar who is requesting a certificate in Alice’s name. Even more sensitive is the second transmission consisting of (CertA, kpr,A). Because the private key is being sent here, not only an authenticated but a secure channel is required. In practice, this could be a certificate delivered by mail or USB stick.

Table 3 Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange with Certificates

 Description Alice Request / Response Bob Both Alice and Bob have private keys issued by a trusted CA a = kpr,A b = kpr,B A = kpub,A ≡ a a  mod p B= kpub,B ≡aB mod p Both Alice and Bob generates a public key and signs it with their private key and identity CertA = [(A,IDA), sA] CertB = [(B,IDB), sB] Certificates are exchanged CertA → ←CertB verify certificate: verify certificate: Both Alice and Bob use the public key of the CA to verify the signature of the certificate verkpub,CA (CertB) verkpub,CA (CertA) compute session key: compute session key: Session key can now be computed. kAB ≡ Ba modp kAB ≡ Ab mod p

One very crucial point here is the verification of the certificates. Obviously, without verification, the signatures within the certificates would be of no use. As can be seen in the protocol, verification requires the public key of the CA. This key must be transmitted via an authenticated channel; What’s happening here from a more abstract point of view is extremely interesting, namely a transfer of trust. With the introduction of certificates, they only have to trust the CA’s public key kpub,CA. If the CA signs other public keys, Alice and Bob know that they can also trust those. This is called a chain of trust.

## Certificate Structure

Discussing the fields defined in a X.509 certificate gives us some insight into many aspects of PKIs. We discuss the most relevant ones in the following:

• Certificate Algorithm: Here it is specified which signature algorithm is being used, e.g., RSA with SHA-1 or ECDSA with SHA-2, and with which parameters, e.g., the bit lengths.
• Issuer: There are many companies and organizations that issue certificates. This field specifies who generated the one at hand.
• Period of Validity: In most cases, a public key is not certified indefinitely but rather for a limited time, e.g., for one or two years. One reason for doing this is that private keys which belong to the certificate may become compromised. By limiting the validity period, there is only a certain time span during which an attacker can maliciously use the private key. Another reason for a restricted lifetime is that, especially for certificates for companies, it can happen that the user ceases to exist. If the certificates, and thus the public keys, are only valid for limited time, the damage can be controlled.
• Subject: This field contains what was called IDA or IDB in our earlier examples. It contains identifying information such as names of people or organizations. Note that not only actual people but also entities like companies can obtain certificates.
• Subject’s Public Key: The public key that is to be protected by the certificate is here. In addition to the binary string which is the public key, the algorithm (e.g., Diffie–Hellman) and the algorithm parameters, e.g., the modulus p and the primitive element a, are stored.
• Signature: The signature over all other fields of the certificate.

We note that for every signature two public key algorithms are involved: the one whose public key is protected by the certificate and the algorithm with which the certificate is signed. These can be entirely different algorithms and parameter sets. For instance, the certificate might be signed with an RSA 2048-bit algorithm, while the public key within the certificate could belong to a 160-bit elliptic curve scheme.

## Certificate Revocation

One major issue in practice is that it must be possible to revoke certificates. A common reason is that a certificate is stored on a smart card which is lost. Another reason could be that a person left an organization and one wants to make sure that she is not using the public key that was given to her. The solution in these situations seems easy: Just publish a list with all certificates that are currently invalid. Such a list is called a certificate revocation list, or CRL. Typically, the serial numbers of certificates are used to identify the revoked certificates. Of course, a CRL must be signed by the CA since otherwise attacks are possible.

The problem with CLRs is how to transmit them to the users. The most straightforward way is that every user contacts the issuing CA every time a certificate of another user is received. The major drawback is that now the CA is involved in every session set-up. This was one major drawback of KDC-based, i.e., symmetric key, approaches. The promise of certificate-based communication was that no online contact to a central authority was needed.

An alternative is that CRLs are sent out periodically. The problem with this approach is that there is always a period during which a certificate is invalid but users have not yet been informed. For instance, if the CRL is sent out at 3:00 am every morning (a time with relatively little network traffic otherwise), a dishonest person could have almost a whole day where a revoked certificate is still valid. To counter this, the CRL update period can be shortened, say to one hour.

However, this would be a tremendous burden on the bandwidth of the network. This is an instructive example for the trade-off between costs in the form of network traffic on one hand, and security on the other hand. In practice, a reasonable compromise must be found. In order to keep the size of CRLs moderate, often only the changes from the last CRL broadcast are sent out. These update-only CRLs are referred to as delta CRLs.

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# Overview

Remote key loading infrastructures generally implement Diebold’s and Triton’s Certificate Based Protocols (CBP), and NCR, Wincor and Hyosung Signature based Protocols.

The Diebold and Triton approaches use X.509 certificates and PKCS message formats to transport key data. NCR, Wincor and Hyosung methods rely on digital signatures to ensure data integrity. Both processes require the loading of the ATM EPP with a public key or certificate at the factory. Both these methods are supported in and XFS compliant manner and this document describes the process of doing so as well as the pitfalls and benefits of using both methods.

## The General Process

### Initialization

A prerequisite for using Remote Keys is for a customer to generate a set of keys or certificates that will be “signed” by a Certificate Authority or Trust Authority. Once signed, the public key or certificate signatures are returned and imported into the Host system. The EPPs obtain their signed public keys or certificates during the manufacturing process before being installed in ATMs.

### Mutual Authentication

With public and private key pairs now present in the Host and in the ATM’s EPP, mutual authentication can be initiated with message exchanges from the Host to the EPP.  The ATM sends the EPP serial number to Host encrypted by its public key or certificate. The Host verifies the message and sends a message back to the EPP encrypted by its public key or certificate.

### Key Delivery

With mutual authentication successfully completed, the Host receives a request to deliver a new terminal master key to the EPP. The Host receives the key request and generates a random terminal master key and encrypts it with the public key of the EPP and “signs” the new TMK message. This message is sent to the EPP. The EPP verifies the signature, decrypts the new terminal master key, and stores the key.

If the dialogue has been successfully completed, the EPP sends a notification back to the Host that it has loaded the new terminal master key including a Key Check Value (KCV) of the new key. If the terminal key load is unsuccessful, an appropriate error message will be returned to the Host. Upon receiving a “successful” terminal master key load message from the EPP with the correct KCV, the Host will establish the new TMK in the key database.

### RSA Data Authentication and Digital Signatures

Digital signatures rely on a public key infrastructure (PKI). The PKI model involves an entity, such as a Host, having a pair of encryption keys – one private, one public. These keys work in consort to encrypt, decrypt and authenticate data.

One-way authentication occurs is through the application of a digital signature. For example:

1. The Host creates some data that it would like to digitally sign;
2. Host runs the data through a hashing algorithm to produce a hash or digest of the data. The digest is unique to every block of data – a digital fingerprint of the data, much smaller and therefore more economical to encrypt than the data itself.
3. Digest is encrypted with the Host’s private key. This is the digital signature – a data block digest encrypted with the private key.

The Host then sends the following to the ATM:

1. Data block.
2. Digital signature.
3. Host’s public key.

To validate the signature, the ATM performs the following:

ATM runs data through the standard hashing algorithm – the same one used by the Host – to produce a digest of the data received. Consider this digest2;

ATM uses the Host’s public key to decrypt the digital signature. The digital signature was produced using the Host’s private key to encrypt the data digest; therefore, when decrypted with the Host’s public key it produces the same digest. Consider this digest1. Incidentally, no other public key in the world would work to decrypt digest1 – only the public key corresponding to the signing private key.

ATM compares digest1 with digest2. If digest1 matches digest2 exactly, the ATM has confirmed that the data was not tampered with in transit. Changing a single bit in the data sent from the Host to the ATM would cause digest2 to be different than digest1. Every data block has a unique digest; therefore, an altered data block is detected by the ATM.

Public key used to decrypt the digital signature corresponds to the private key used to create it. No other public key could possibly work to decrypt the digital signature, so the ATM was not handed someone else’s public key.

This gives an overview of how Digital Signatures can be used in Data Authentication. In particular, Signatures can be used to validate and securely install Encryption Keys.

The following section describes Key Exchange and the use of Digital signatures.

### RSA Secure Key Exchange using Digital Signatures

In summary, both end points, the ATM and the Host, inform each other of their Public Keys. This information is then used to securely send the PIN device Master Key to the ATM.

A trusted third party, the Signature Issuer, is used to generate the signatures for the Public keys of each end point, ensuring their validity.

The detail of this is as follows:

#### Purpose:

The Host wishes to install a new master key (KM) on the ATM securely.

#### Assumptions:

• The Host has obtained the Public Key (PKSI) from the Signature Issuer.
• The Host has provided the Signature Issuer with its Public Key (PKHOST), and receives the corresponding signature Sign(SKSI)[ PKHOST]. The Signature Issuer uses its own Private Key (SKSI) to create this signature.
• In the case where Enhanced Remote Key Loading is used, the Host has provided the Signature Issuer with its Public Key (PKROOT), and receives the corresponding signature Sign(SKSI)[PKROOT]. The Host has generated another key pair PKHOST and SKHOST and signs the PKHOST with the SKROOT.
• (Optional) The Host obtains a list of the valid PIN device’s Unique Identifiers. The Signature Issuer installs a Signature Sign(SKSI)[ UIATM] for the Unique Id (UIATM) on the ATM PIN. The Signature Issuer uses SKSI to do this.
• The Signature Issuer installs its Public Key (PKSI) on the ATM PIN. It also derives and installs the Signature Sign(SKSI )[PKATM] of the ATM PIN’s Public Key (PKATM) on the ATM PIN. The Signature Issuer uses SKSI to do this.
• The ATM PIN device additionally contains its own Public (PKATM) and Private Key (SKATM).

#### Steps for the Process

Step 1: The ATM PIN sends its Public Key to the Host in a secure structure: The ATM PIN sends its ATM Public Key with its associated Signature. When the Host receives this information it will use the Signature Issuer’s Public Key to validate the signature and obtain the ATM Public Key.

Step 2 (Optional):  The Host verifies that the key it has just received is from a valid sender. It does this by obtaining the PIN device unique identifier. The ATM PIN sends its Unique Identifier with its associated Signature. When the Host receives this information it will use the Signature Issuer’s Public Key to validate the signature and retrieve the PIN Unique Identifier. It can then check this against the list it received from the Signature Issuer.

Step 3 (Enhanced Remote Key Loading only) : The Host sends its root public key to the ATM PIN: The Host sends its Root Public Key (PKROOT) and associated Signature. The ATM PIN verifies the signature using PKSI and stores the key.

Step 4:  The Host sends its public key to the ATM PIN: The Host sends its Public Key (PKHOST) and associated Signature. The ATM PIN verifies the signature using PKSI (or PKROOT in the Enhanced Remote Key Loading Scheme) and stores the key

Step 5:  The ATM PIN receives its Master Key from the Host: The Host encrypts the Master Key (KM) with PKATM. A signature for this is then created. The ATM PIN will then validate the signature using PKHOST and then obtain the master key by decrypting using SKATM.

Step 6 – Alternative including random number:  The Host requests the ATM PIN to begin the DES key transfer process and generate a random number. The Host encrypts the Master Key (KM) with PKATM. A signature for the random number and encrypted key is then created using SKHOST. The ATM PIN will then validate the signature using PKHOST, verify the random number and then obtain the master key by decrypting using SKATM.

### Certificate Exchange and Authentication

Both end points, the ATM and the Host, inform each other of their Public Keys. This information is then used to securely send the PIN device Master Key to the ATM. A trusted third party, Certificate Authority (or a HOST if it becomes the new CA), is used to generate the certificates for the Public Keys of each end point, ensuring their validity. In this message contains the Host certificate, which has been signed by the trusted CA. The Pinpad Cryptography Unit (CTU) uses the Public Key of the CA (loaded at the time of production) to verify the validity of the certificate. If the certificate is valid, the CTU stores the HOST’s Public Verification Key. The CTU then sends a message that contains a certificate, which is signed by the CA and is sent to the HOST. The HOST uses the Public Key from the CA to verify the certificate. If valid then the HOST stores the CTU’s verification or encryption key (primary or secondary this depends on the state of the CTU).

### Remote Key Exchange

After the above has been completed, the HOST is ready to load the key into the CTU.

The following is done to complete this and the application must complete the Remote Key Exchange in this order:

1. Return RATM from the CTU to be used in authenticating the message.
2. Next, the ATM sends down the KTK to the CTU. The following items below show how this is accomplished.
3. a) HOST has obtained a Key Transport Key and wants to transfer it to the CTU. HOST constructs a key block containing an identifier of the HOST, IHOST, and the key, KKTK, and enciphers the block, using the CTU’s Public Encryption Key.
4. b) After completing the above, the HOST generates random data and builds the outer message containing the random number of the Host, RHOST, and the random number of the ATM, RATM. The identifier of the CTU, IENC, and the enciphered key block. The HOST signs the whole block using its private signature key and sends the message down to the CTU. The CTU then verifies the HOST’s signature on the message by using the HOST’s Public Verification Key. Then the CTU checks the identifier and the random number of the CTU passed in the message to make sure that the CTU is talking to the right HOST. The CTU then deciphers the enciphered block using its private verification key. After the message has been deciphered, the CTU checks the Identifier of the HOST. Finally, if everything checks out to this point the CTU will load the Key Transport Key
5. c) After the Key Transport Key has been accepted, the CTU constructs a message that contains the random number of the Host, the random number of the CTU and the HOST identifier all signed by the private signature key of the CTU. This message is sent to the Host.
6. d) The HOST verifies the message sent from the CTU by using the ATM’s public verification key. The HOST then checks the identifier of the Host and then compares the identifier in the message with the one stored in the HOST. Then checks the random number sent in the message and to the one stored in the HOST. The HOST finally checks the CTU’s random number with the one received.

### Replace Certificate

After the key is been loaded into the CTU, the following could be completed: The new CA requests a Certificate from the previous Certificate Authority. The HOST must over-sign the message to take over the role of the CA to ensure that the CTU accepts the new Certificate Authority. The HOST sends the message to the CTU. The CTU uses the HOST’s Public Verification Key to verify the HOST’s signature. The CTU uses the previous CA’s Public Verification Key to verify the signature on the new Certificate sent down in the message. If valid, the EPP stores the new CA’s certificate and uses the new CA’s Public Verification Key as its new CA verification key.

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Financial Switching

# The Refund vulnerability of AS2805 and EFTPOS

Transactions are normally validated, matched then processed. This is very common to ensure that requests sent to a payments switch are associated with its responses before delivering responses to a terminal. Now for all transaction types this process in true, except for refunds. Well, at least it’s not matched for most financial institutions in Australia.

Below is a few descriptions of transactions that might be processed through a typical switch in Australia:

Authorization / Cash Out

The Authorization transaction is typically used by a merchant to obtain the authorization of a transaction amount as a pre-approval for the purchase of goods or services later during the fulfillment process. Authorization transactions are typically submitted for authorization and then funds are held by the issuer until that transaction is captured or the authorization is reversed or expires. An example can be found with online retailers who initiate an Authorization transaction to guaranteed funding by the card issuer prior to the shipment/delivery (i.e. fulfillment) of the goods. An “Authorization” is also referred to as an Auth-Only transaction.

Sale / Purchase

A “Sale” transaction is used by merchants for the immediate purchase of goods or services. This transaction completes both the authorization and capture in a single transaction request. The Sale transaction is an Authorization and Capture transaction that if approved is automatically included for settlement.

Forced Sale

A “Forced Sale” is a transaction initiated by a merchant with the intent of forcing the posting of the transaction against the customer account without receiving prior authorization by the card issuer, or receiving a voice authorization code from the merchant acquiring call center. An example would be when a merchant’s terminal is offline, requiring the purchase of goods being completed without receiving online authorization by the card issuer. Or they received a Voice Approval. In these cases the merchant would enter the transaction details and forward this Forced Sale transaction to the card issuer with the expectation of receiving funding for the goods or services rendered. A forced sale does not require a matching authorization. Forced Sales are also known as Off-Line Sales.

Refund

A Refund allows a merchant to refund a previously settled transaction and submit the refund for processing. Refunds are only allowed for financial transactions (Sale and Captured) and are typically limited to the original authorization amount, or a lesser amount, in some cases, multiple partial refunds up to the original transaction amount. Some systems incorporate a feature called Matched Refunds. Matched Refunds must match back to an original transaction to help control fraud. “ Refunds” are also sometimes referred to as a “Credit” transaction.

Void

Void transactions can reverse transactions that have been previously authorized or approved by the card issuer and are pending settlement. Merchants will only be allowed to void transactions that are in an open batch (pending settlement). Sale or Refund transactions are the most commonly voided transaction types.

Capture

The Capture transaction will allow merchants to capture a previously authorized transaction that is pending settlement, and submit it for clearing and settlement. An example is when online retailers who initiate an Authorization transaction to reserve funds by the card issuer prior to the shipment/delivery (i.e. fulfillment) of the goods, and then once fulfillment has been completed the transaction will be captured and submitted for settlement. A “Capture” is also referred to as a Pre-Authorization Completion transaction.

Now According to the AS2805 Specifications,   The refund is not matched to the transaction during the refund authorization, and will approve by default, you need to match the Refund to an Authorization or Sale when doing settlement.

This appears not implemented in Australia for some reason, and some financial institutions will actually admit it.

I have tried this on a EFTPOS machine, you should try this as well. Simply do a refund on a EFTPOS terminal without doing a transaction. All you would need is a 4 digit password to access the refund function (in some cases  refunds are not password protected) , these default passwords are published by the terminal manufacturers.

In every case that I’ve tried this, the refund is processed and the funds appeared in my account. This is surely a massive risk for fraud!!!!

Strange enough, the banks are not worried about this as the funds are tied to the merchant account, and it’s not a risk for the bank but for the Merchant. These are some clause in the contracts that absolve them from the risk.

So if you have a EFTPOS terminal, ask for the refund function to be disabled or you could be out of pocket!

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